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Abstract 
The main purpose of our thesis is to examine the long-run relationship between WTI 
and Brent. Historically, the prices fluctuated around a constant differential, where 
WTI traded above Brent due to its slightly higher quality. Recently, the differential 
has been reversed as Brent has traded at a premium to WTI since 2010. We analyze 
the unusual behavior in the price relationship with the use of an Engle-Granger two-
step test for cointegration to assess if the relationship has ended, and whether a new 
has been formed. We also decompose the WTI-Brent spread to examine if the 
deviation can be accrued to supply or demand conditions. Finally, we build an 
empirical model to determine what factors have had a significant impact on the 
spread’s divergence. 
 
We find that the long-run relationship between WTI and Brent ended in January 2010, 
and that a new relationship was established early 2014. However, the new relationship 
is different from its predecessor as Brent is now being traded at a premium to WTI. 
From our empirical findings we infer that insufficient pipeline infrastructure at 
Cushing is significant in explaining the spread’s divergence. We also conclude that 
shipping costs significantly affected the spread and have prolonged the divergence 
between WTI and Brent. 
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1. Introduction 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has been trading at an unusual discount relative to 
Brent since 2010. Historically, the two have moved in unison, with WTI trading at a 
premium to Brent due to its slightly higher quality. Now, however, the two crudes 
have set on different paths, with WTI experiencing a fall in prices without a 
corresponding fall in the price of Brent. That two international benchmarks have 
decoupled from their long-term price relationship could have widespread implications 
for the oil industry.  
 
We wish to examine the price divergence between WTI and Brent. First we will try to 
establish when the price relationship between the two ended. If a break is found, we 
will examine whether it was only a temporary occurrence and if WTI and Brent have 
formed a new relationship. To further study the unusual price movements, we break 
down the spread between WTI and Brent into supply and demand components, and 
build an empirical model to quantify what factors have affected the spread. 
 
The North American benchmark WTI is of great importance in today’s oil pricing 
system. The crude underlies sweet crude contracts traded at the New York Mercantile 
Index, and is one of the most significant commodity contracts on the market. Its 
European counterpart Brent is financially traded on the Intercontinental Exchange in 
London, and accounts for over two thirds of the world’s total trade in physical oil 
(Intercontinental Exchange, 2013). As a consequence, Brent is widely referred to as 
the leading global crude benchmark. 
 
The WTI and Brent benchmarks are integral parts of the crude oil pricing system, 
comprising the price foundation for nearly all other crudes. The similar qualities 
between the crudes are key to the benchmarking system, with their price differences 
being fairly constant. Historically this is said to be true, with WTI being priced $1-4 
per barrel above Brent due to its slight quality premium (Carollo, 2011). Bassam 
Fattouh (2009) contributes the constant price differential between the crudes to the oil 
market being one great pool. An implication of his theory is that crudes of similar 
quality will move closely together, as supply and demand shocks that affect one crude 
should be transferred to others.  
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The almost constant price differential between WTI and Brent was for a long time a 
stated fact. However, since 2010 the price differential, or spread, has diverged from 
its historic trend and Brent is currently traded at a premium to its North American 
counterpart. The spread reached its peak in August 2011, when Brent traded at a $26 
premium to WTI. According to Fattouh’s (2009) research, the prices of the two 
should behave similarly, with the price fluctuations of one affecting the other. This, 
however, has not been the case. 
 
Although there is abundance of research, both on the price movements of crude oil 
and the divergence of the WTI-Brent spread, less research has been conducted 
towards pinpointing the end of the relationship and examining whether the crudes 
have formed a new relationship. With the help of econometrical techniques we wish 
to examine the price relationship between WTI and Brent, as well as quantifying 
certain effects behind the divergence.  
 
We start by presenting our hypotheses in section 2. A presentation of the properties of 
crude oil, the modern history of the oil market and a description of the crude oil 
market is outlined in section 3. We review literature relevant to our thesis in section 4, 
before presenting specific events that affect crude oil prices in section 5. To easier 
comprehend crude oil price fluctuations we present a theoretical analysis on crude oil 
price movements in section 6. Our empirical analysis is presented in section 7 and is 
divided into sections for our sample data, cointegration analysis, spread 
decomposition and empirical findings. We discuss limitations and implications of our 
research in the same section, before presenting our final conclusions in section 8. 
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2. Hypotheses 
In this section we present and explain our hypotheses. They all originate from the 
unusual behavior in the spread between WTI and Brent and literature pertaining to the 
subject.  
2.1.1 Hypothesis 1: The Long-Term Relationship 
Our first hypothesis is based on the fact that WTI has traded at a discount to Brent 
since 2010. Historically, WTI and Brent moved in tandem with a spread of $1-4 per 
barrel in favor of WTI (Carollo, 2011). The reversal in the price relationship could 
imply that the widely acknowledged long-run relationship between the crudes has 
ended. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The long-term relationship between WTI and Brent ended in 
early 2010. 
 
Between 2010 and 2014 Brent traded at an unusual premium to WTI, but has recently 
moved towards the once familiar price differential. This may have established a new 
relationship between the crudes, where WTI is traded at a small discount to Brent.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: A new relationship between WTI and Brent was established at 
the beginning of 2014.  
 
We also want to determine what caused the unusual behavior in the spread. Crude oil 
has a physical dimension that anchors its price to fundamentals in the oil market. The 
unusual price difference between WTI and Brent is therefore likely to be caused by 
changes in these fundamentals.  
2.1.2 Hypothesis 2: The Structural Changes in North America 
There are indications that fundamentals in the North American market have caused 
the price divergence between WTI and Brent. Increasing crude oil production, leading 
to a greater inflow of crude oil to Cushing, caused storage facilities to reach 
maximum capacity in 2010. A lack of pipeline infrastructure constrained 
transportation of the excess crude to coastal refineries, with the combined factors 
leading to a decrease in the price of WTI. 
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Hypothesis 2: Increasing crude oil production in North America, as well as 
insufficient pipeline infrastructure out of Cushing, caused the unusual 
behavior in the WTI-Brent spread. 
 
In addition to having a physical dimension, crude oil is traded as a financial 
instrument. Some of these instruments can impact crude oil prices, causing shifts 
beyond their underlying fundamental value. 
2.1.3 Hypothesis 3: The Financial Market Activity 
The futures contracts for WTI and Brent are the most traded commodity contracts in 
the world. In 2011 a relative weight change in favor of Brent in the world’s largest 
commodity indices allocated large money flows in the financial market from WTI 
into Brent futures. The relative weight change increased the open interest, an indicator 
for activity and liquidity in the financial market, for Brent relative to WTI. However, 
these changes may already be accounted for by market participants and embedded in 
the prices, and so will not have an effect on the spread.  
Hypothesis 3: The open interest for WTI and Brent futures did not have a 
significant impact on the price divergence between WTI and Brent.  
We will test our hypotheses in several sections. In section 7.2 we test the relationship 
between WTI and Brent with an Engle-Granger two-step test for cointegration. We 
decompose the spread into time and commodity spreads to understand the underlying 
shifts in section 7.3. Finally, we present an empirical model to quantify the underlying 
shifts in section 7.5. 
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3. Theory 
In this section we present theory concerning the crude oil market and the formation of 
crude oil prices. Without an understanding of the fundamentals in the crude oil 
market, it will be difficult to comprehend the implications of our empirical findings. 
3.1 What is Crude Oil1 
Crude oil is a heterogeneous commodity and its appearance varies, from an almost 
brown sludge to a light colorless liquid. Fossil fuels, such as crude oil, are non-
renewable energy sources, implying that the resource does not renew itself at a 
sufficient rate for sustainable economic extraction in meaningful human time frames. 
In its most simple form crude oil consists of molecules and hydrocarbon chains of 
varying length.  
 
The number of hydrocarbons, in addition to the heat at which the hydrocarbons form, 
determines the density and classification of the crude oil. The American Petroleum 
Institute (API) classifies crude oil as either light, medium or heavy in density. The 
API gravity index is a measure of how heavy or light the crude oil is compared to 
water. The less dense the crude oil, the higher the API gravity, hence high gravity 
crudes are known as light crudes while low gravity crudes are referred to as heavy 
crudes. 
 
Light crudes usually have an API gravity between 35 and 40 degrees. Due to fewer 
long-chain molecules and lower wax content, it has lower viscosity and is therefore 
easier to both extract and transport. This leads to lower operating costs for both 
producers and refiners, which in turn has historically led to higher demand. 
 
Heavy crudes, on the other hand, usually have an API gravity between 16 and 20 
degrees. What identifies heavier crudes is higher viscosity and that they contain high 
concentrations of sulfur and metals. These properties make them difficult to extract 
and transport through pipeline, making refining more costly. 
                                                
1 This section is based on Deutsche Bank’s report “Oil & Gas for Beginners” (2013). 
2 The assessment of the Brent benchmark is based on the article ”An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing System” 
written by Bassam Fattouh for the Oxford Instititute for Energy Studies (2011). 
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In addition to hydrocarbons, all crudes contain sulfur, released on combustion as 
sulfur dioxide. The sulfur needs to be removed from the oil before refining, leading to 
higher demand for crude oils with low percentage of sulfur. Crudes containing lower 
percentage of sulfur are known as sweet, whereas those with high percentage are 
known as sour. Crude oil is classified as sweet if it contains less than 0.5% sulfur. 
Light sweet crude oil contains a disproportionate amount of high-quality distillate 
products and is therefore the most sought after crude. 
 
If the total sulfide level in the crude is over 1% it is defined as sour and contains 
impurities such as hydrogen and carbon dioxide. Since these impurities must be 
removed before the crude can be utilized, the cost of refining increases. Due to these 
increased costs, sour oils are in lower demand and sold with a discount compared to 
high quality crudes.  
 
Crude oil itself cannot be utilized; it has to be refined into usable products. Refining 
produces a wide variety of products, from heating oil to petroleum gas. The range of 
products from a barrel of crude oil is dependent on the quality of the crude. For WTI 
and Brent a typical yield, the proportion of refined products in one barrel of crude, is 
shown in table 1.  
 
Table 1 - Typical Light Sweet Crude Yield (Deutsche Bank, 2013) 
 
Not all outputs have the same market value. Some outputs, such as diesel, sell at a 
premium to heavier fuels. In addition, the heavier outputs tend to be more easily 
substitutable with other energy alternatives, capping their price movements even at 
higher crude oil prices.  
Product Light Sweet Crude Yield
Petroleum Gas 3 %
Naptha 6 %
Gasoline 21 %
Kerosene 6 %
Gasoil/Diesel (Middle distillates) 36 %
Fuel Oil 19 %
Others (Residual, lubricants) 9 %
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3.1.1 Properties of WTI and Brent 
A variety of crude oils are produced around the world with their market value defined 
by quality characteristics. WTI and Brent are today the key international benchmarks 
for crude oil, with their prices used as a barometer for a majority of the industry. 
Their similarities can be seen in the spot price development between 2000 and 2014, 
where the two move in tandem until 2010. Their price development is depicted in 
figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Spot Price Development WTI and Brent (Bloomberg L.P., 2014e) 
 
To further illustrate, the specific quality characteristics of the WTI and Brent are 
outlined in table 2. WTI is of a slightly higher quality than Brent as its sulfur content 
is lower. All else equal, the lower sulfur content implies that WTI should be sold at a 
slight premium relative to Brent.  
 
Table 2 - API Gravity and Sulfur Content of WTI and Brent (U.S. EIA, 2012b) 
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3.1.1.1 The Brent Benchmark2 
The crudes comprising the Brent benchmark is extracted from the North Sea and acts 
as a representative for a wide variety of crudes. Brent as a benchmark has evolved 
from one single crude representing the whole North Sea, to a mix of several crudes. 
 
Brent was the first crude to act as a representative for the North Sea, and is a mixture 
of oil produced from several fields delivering to the terminal at Sullom Voe in the 
Shetland Islands, United Kingdom. As production started to decline in the 1980s, 
Brent was comingled with Ninian to stop opportunities of manipulation and 
distortion. The new benchmark was named Brent Blend.  
 
Brent Blend was used as a benchmark until 2002, when production hit an all-time 
low. In order to counter this, the Brent Blend was broadened to include Forties and 
Oseberg. The new benchmark was known as Brent-Forties-Oseberg (BFO). With the 
inclusion of these two crudes it resulted in a distribution over a wider range of 
companies, reducing the dominance of oil producing companies and decreasing 
opportunities to distort the benchmark. 
 
In 2007, Ekofisk was included in the benchmark, leading to the creation of the 
benchmark that is in use today, Brent-Forties-Oseberg-Ekofisk (BFOE). The inclusion 
of Ekofisk increased the physical base of the benchmark, and is the status quo of 
today. 
 
The inclusion of the different crude oils with diverse quality aspects has had 
implications on the pricing of the benchmark. Any of the four crudes can be delivered 
against a BFOE contract, and thus sellers wish to deliver the cheapest grade of crude. 
In the BFOE blend, Forties has the lowest quality with regard to API and sulfur 
content and thus sets the price and quality grade of the benchmark. 
 
                                                
2 The assessment of the Brent benchmark is based on the article ”An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing System” 
written by Bassam Fattouh for the Oxford Instititute for Energy Studies (2011). 
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Table 3 - API Gravity and Sulfur Content of BFOE (U.S. EIA, 2012b) 
 
There are several aspects that favor the choice of Brent as a benchmark. Brent is 
seaborne and can be transported to refineries in Europe and other parts of the world 
when arbitrage opportunities deem transportation profitable, making it easily 
marketable. The geographic location makes it an ideal benchmark as the North Sea is 
close to refineries both in Europe and the United States (U.S.). With four different 
crudes constituting the benchmark, the large production volume makes it difficult to 
manipulate. 
 
However, it is not just the volume of production that makes it an ideal benchmark. An 
important aspect is that the United Kingdom’s government acts as an overseer for 
Brent, providing a transparent legal and regulatory body. In addition, due to its 
inclusion of several crudes, no producer has monopoly on the blend, which is one of 
the most important aspects of a benchmark (Horsnell & Mabro, 1993).  
 
The Brent benchmark sets the price for most of the global crude market, which 
underlines its importance. Around 70% of the world’s crude is priced relative to the 
Brent benchmark (RBN Energy, 2013).  
3.1.1.2 The WTI Benchmark3 
WTI has its origin in the crude oil fields of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas and New 
Mexico. The crude oil is landlocked, as opposed to the seaborne Brent, and is thus 
subject to domestic infrastructure problems. Deliveries of the crude are made to 
Cushing, Oklahoma, which is strategically placed to serve the refineries along the 
Gulf of Mexico.  
 
                                                
3 The assessment of the WTI benchmark is based on the article “An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing System” 
written by Bassam Fattouh for the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2011). 
Crude Oil API Gravity Sulfur Content
Brent Blend 38.3° 0.37%
Forties Blend 40.3° 0.56%
Oseberg Blend 37.8° 0.27%
Ekofisk Blend 37.5° 0.23%
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The U.S. market consists of several crudes besides WTI. One of these crudes is the 
Light Louisiana Sweet (LLS), which has become a local benchmark for sweet crude 
along the Gulf Coast. LLS is seaborne and can easily be transported to meet world 
demand or stockpiled cheaply on floating storage facilities, making it less exposed to 
the domestic problems WTI might experience. LLS is of similar quality to WTI and 
Brent. Another crude oil of significance in the U.S. is the West Texas Sour (WTS), a 
lower quality crude being stored at Cushing, OK. Both crudes’ qualitiy aspects are 
depicted in table 4. 
 
Table 4 - API Gravity and Sulfur Content of LLS and WTS (U.S. EIA, 2012b) 
 
Despite there being a wide variety of crudes, WTI has become the main benchmark 
for pricing crude in the U.S. This is because WTI underlies the Light Sweet Crude Oil 
futures contract, one of the largest and most actively traded commodity futures 
contract. In addition, WTI is traded in smaller volumes than other crudes, making it 
easier for investors to find the necessary credit and storage facilities to participate in 
its trading. Furthermore, its liquidity is high, solidifying it as an apt benchmark for the 
U.S. crude market (CME Group, 2010).  
 
Unlike Brent, WTI has seen a surge in production, especially from unconventional oil 
from Canada and the U.S. A surge in crude oil prices over a prolonged period spurred 
innovations that lead to these resources becoming economically viable.  
Unconventional oil represented a major shift in supply side conditions, with North 
American crude production accounting for 14% of global crude production in 2012 
(Erbach, 2014). 
 
Canada has large deposits of oil sand, representing the largest undeveloped, oil 
resource globally. These reserves contain heavy, thick deposits of bitumen-coated 
sand, which require significant amounts of energy, making its extraction capital 
intensive.  
 
Crude Oil API Gravity Sulfur Content
LLS 35.6° 0.37%
WTS 31.7° 1.28%
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The unconventional oil deposits in the U.S. are mainly tight oil from the Bakken field 
in North Dakota and the Eagle Ford Plays in Texas. Tight oil is a subset of tight 
hydrocarbons with the key, differentiating factor being that its reservoir rock, shale, is 
also the source rock for the oil.  
3.2 Modern History of the Oil Market4 
The current oil pricing system has emerged in response to changing power balances, 
shifts in political and economic structures, as well as fundamental changes to supply 
and demand. It has gone from a monopolistic pricing system to the market based 
system we know today. 
 
Until late 1950s the oil price was controlled by multinational companies, known as 
the Seven Sisters5, who accounted for 85% of the oil production outside Canada, the 
U.S., the USSR and China. These multinationals had interests in both up- and 
downstream production, owning the whole value chain from exploration to refining. 
Governments received royalties and taxes, but did not participate in pricing the oil. 
Until the 1970s the pricing system, known as the posted price, was built on these 
royalties. The period was characterized by a market with few participants and 
imperfect competition, where multinational companies set prices to minimize their tax 
liabilities around the world. 
 
In 1960 the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed 
by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela to coordinate tax and royalty 
policies, obtain resources from private companies, as well as preventing declining 
revenues for its members. Even though large multinational companies still dominated 
the market in the 1960s, smaller independent companies were entering the market. 
This was due to the fact that countries, like Venezuela and Libya, granted concessions 
to smaller participants as they saw an opportunity to gain higher government tax and 
royalties. 
                                                
4 This section is sourced from “An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing System” written for the Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies by Bassam Fattouh (2011). 
5 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (now BP), Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California (SoCal), Texaco (now Chevron), 
Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Esso) and Standard Oil Company of New York (Now 
ExxonMobil). 
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In the period between 1965 and 1973 the global demand for oil increased rapidly. As 
a response, OPEC increased production to meet the surging demand. In 1973, in 
response to having gained a significant share of the world crude market, power shifted 
in favor of OPEC as they for the first time sat a posted price. 
 
During the 1970s the concept of marker price was introduced, a predecessor to what is 
now known as crude benchmarking. This further shifted the power of oil pricing from 
the multinational companies to OPEC. Arabian Light from Saudi Arabia was chosen 
as the first marker crude and prices were set relative to this.  
 
The Iranian crisis in 1979 led to an abrupt disruption in the supply of crude oil. This 
forced multinational companies to buy crude in the open market to meet their 
refineries’ demand. As a consequence, a new spot market emerged with higher 
transparency, making it easier for non-OPEC countries and private companies to 
establish themselves in the oil market. 
 
In the early 1980s, OPEC increased its production in response to higher crude oil 
prices. However, the worldwide recession in the mid 1980s caused a decline in the 
demand for oil. This represented a major challenge to OPEC’s marker pricing system, 
ultimately leading to its demise.  
 
Another factor leading to the demise of OPEC’s marker pricing system was that more 
oil reached international markets as non-OPEC members made new discoveries and 
increased production. As non-OPEC members priced their oil to market conditions, 
they were able to charge a lower price for their crude compared to OPEC. Suppliers, 
who had an excess of crude, undercut prices in the spot market, ultimately leading to a 
decline in the demand for OPEC crude.  
 
As it became clear to OPEC that attempts to defend the marker price would only 
result in a lower market share, they adopted a new pricing system, the netback pricing 
system. Other oil exporting countries adopted the system, which provided companies 
with a guaranteed refinery margin. This led refineries to oversupply the market with 
refined products, leading to the oil price collapse in 1986. 
  
18 
After the crisis a new market system for pricing crude oil emerged, known as formula 
pricing. The system is an arrangement where a buyer and seller agree in advance on 
the price to be paid for a product delivered in the future. This benchmark price is 
based upon a pre-determined calculation, and is still in use today. OPEC abandoned 
its netback pricing system and adopted the new market system, and so transferred the 
pricing power to the market. 
 
In 1988 the new market related pricing system was widely accepted amongst most oil-
exporting countries. In the subsequent years the technological revolution made 
electronic 24-hour trading possible from anywhere in the world. The revolution 
enabled the development of a complex pricing system of interlinked oil markets, 
consisting of spot, physical forwards, futures and other derivatives in the paper 
market.  
 
With the exception of the time period around the Iranian crisis in 1979, crudes prices 
normally fluctuated around $20 to $30 per barrel. However, since 1998, crude prices 
have soared to a record high of $145 in July 2008, before falling during the financial 
crisis. At the time of writing, WTI and Brent is traded at around $70 dollar per barrel. 
The annual average of the historic oil price is depicted in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 – Annual Average Historic Oil Price (Inflation Data, 2014) 
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3.3 World Oil Markets Today 
The global oil market is the largest energy market, measured in both value and 
volume. In 2011 crude oil served around 33% of the global energy needs (Deutsche 
Bank, 2013).  
 
The New York Mercantile Index (NYMEX) and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) 
are the main international exchanges for the trading of crude oil. The exchanges allow 
for trade in both the spot market for immediate delivery and the forward and futures 
market for deliveries at a predetermined date. This provides market participants with 
hedging, speculation and price discovery opportunities. 
 
Due to the large number of crudes around the world, benchmarks are widely used to 
set prices, both for physical delivery and in the financial market. The two most 
important are, as previously mentioned WTI and Brent. All other crudes, with some 
exceptions, are traded at a discount or premium to these benchmarks, depending on 
their quality aspects, as explained in section 3.1. 
3.3.1 Futures Market 
Futures trading, as we know it today, evolved when farmers and merchants committed 
to future exchanges of grain for cash in the 19th century. A century later, in 1983, 
NYMEX introduced trading in crude oil futures with delivery of light sweet crude oil 
at Cushing, Oklahoma. A few years later the International Petroleum Exchange, now 
ICE, introduced futures trading in Brent derivatives (Gülen, 1998). Since the 
introduction of formula pricing in 1988, and the technological development of 
trading, futures have played an increasing part in pricing crude oil deliveries, and has 
evolved into a foundation for determining spot prices for North American crude 
(Deutsche Bank, 2013). 
 
The largest exchange-traded commodity in the world was for a long time WTI, 
trading at a volume nearly four times that of Brent (Clayton, 2013). The futures 
contract is often bought by refineries located on the Gulf Coast and in the mid-
continent of the U.S., and is thus highly sensitive to regional supply and demand 
factors.  
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Due to the liquidity of the WTI futures contracts and the fact that the U.S. is the 
largest oil consumer globally, WTI is of great importance and a point of reference for 
the domestic market (U.S. EIA, 2014b). In addition, futures contracts for WTI are the 
best visible real-time reference price for the market. Negotiations in the spot market 
will therefore use the futures price as a reference point (Platts, 2010). 
 
The Brent futures contract traded on ICE surpassed the WTI contract in 2013, and is 
today the largest traded crude oil future in the world (Clayton, 2013). Brent futures 
are, unlike WTI, settled financially. The settlement is a weighted average of all trades 
in the physical market for the month in question for each underlying component of the 
Brent benchmark. The financial instrument is far more complex than WTI, due to the 
inclusion of four crudes, Brent-Forties-Oseberg-Ekofisk, in one instrument (Fattouh, 
2011). 
 
Crude oil has, unlike pure financial assets, a physical dimension that anchors 
expectations to fundamentals of the oil market. Every day millions of barrels are 
bought and sold at prices determined in the market. By the law of one price a good 
must sell for the same price in all locations, and thus the futures market should 
eventually converge with the spot market to remove the possibility of arbitrage. 
However, if perceptions of future market fundamentals are uncertain, exaggerated or 
both, the futures market can diverge away from the underlying fundamental value and 
create a bubble (Deutsche Bank, 2013).  
 
Market participants use the futures market in different ways to make a profit or hedge 
against loss. Commercial traders, producers and consumers of crude and refined 
products, optimize their portfolio by hedging exposure. Mainstream institutional and 
retail investors trade in the market to profit from movements in the price, often known 
to be hedge funds or pension funds. Traders and commodity trading advisor’s attempt 
to profit from price deviations between regions and commodities or to anticipate the 
future price of crude oil (Deutsche Bank, 2013).  
3.3.2 Forward Curve 
The forward curve is the series of sequential prices for future delivery of crude oil or 
expected future settlements of an index. It has increased in importance along with the 
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growing financial market, with expectations of supply and demand being reflected in 
the curve. An upward sloping forward curve indicates higher prices in the future. This 
again indicates that one expects demand to increase more relative to supply, that 
supply is going to tighten, or that spare capacity of crude oil is more limited in the 
future. 
 
An upward sloping forward curve, referred to as contango, where the futures price of 
a commodity increase with time, is considered normal, stripped from all expectations 
of future demand and supply. This is due to the fact that cost of carry, i.e., the cost of 
storing the crude, is included in the curve and thus the price will be higher for future 
delivery. If the curve slopes downwards, referred to as backwardation, it implies that 
the market expects either demand to decrease more relative to supply, a surge in 
supply or that the spare capacity of crude oil is less limited in the future (Deutsche 
Bank, 2013). 
4. Literature Review 
In this section we present relevant literature for our thesis. We review literature 
regarding the pricing of non-renewable resources, and more specifically WTI and 
Brent. Literature pertaining to the crude oil markets and the WTI-Brent spread is also 
presented. Based on the literature review we give a brief discussion on how we utilize 
earlier research in our thesis. 
 
The pricing of crude oil has been widely reviewed by several papers (see e.g. 
Hotelling, 1931; Horsnell & Mabro, 1993; Bacon & Tordo, 2004; Hamilton, 2008; 
Carollo, 2011; Amadeo, 2014). All reviews are based on the fact that crude oil is a 
finite resource; meaning that at some point in time oil reserves might be depleted. It 
was Harold Hotelling who first described the evolution of non-renewable resource 
pricing. In his article “The Economics of Exhaustible Resources” from 1931, 
Hotelling states that the price of a finite resource must rise at a rate equal to the 
discount rate, known as the Hotelling’s rule or scarcity rent. He also showed that in 
competitive markets, his rule maximizes the value of the resource stock. As a 
consequence, all else equal, the price of crude oil must rise and continue to rise in the 
future. 
  
22 
However, Hotelling’s model does not fully reflect reality, as his assumptions are 
simplifications of the real world. Hotelling assumes perfect competition and that the 
stock is fully known. Further, he assumes that the resource extracted is used 
completely with no waste, nothing left for reuse and that there are no externalities or 
market failures. Lastly, Hotelling assumes that the cost of extraction is constant and 
that there are no alternatives to the resource. 
 
Hotelling’s model has been extended in various ways in later papers. Krautkraemer 
(1998) finds that the Hotelling model has not been consistent with empirical studies of 
non-renewable resource prices, as there has not been a persistent increase in prices 
over the last 125 years. His review emphasizes that, as non-renewable stocks are not 
known, technological progress that lowers the cost of extraction and processing, and 
the discovery of new deposits, has played a greater role than finite availability in 
pricing non-renewable resources. His empirical analysis also proves that non-
renewable resources often have usable residuals from production, and thus must be 
calculated in the total price of the non-renewable resource.  
 
In a theoretical analysis in the same research paper, Krautkraemer reviews the effects 
of backstop technology on the price of non-renewable resources. As a finite resource 
increases in price, other alternative resources, backstops, will become relatively 
cheaper and thus preferable for consumers. He also illustrates how heterogeneous 
quality aspects affect the price of a non-renewable resource. Based on his review, 
Krautkraemer extends the basic model to account for these factors. 
 
Recently, attention has been focused towards incorporating the issue of climate policy 
in the Hotelling model. Kolstad and Toman (2001) argue that crude oil prices should 
reflect climate issues, and modifies the model to take into account how increased 
greenhouse gas emissions causes reduction in welfare over time. 
 
Hotelling’s model and later research on the subject have provided a deeper 
understanding of how prices of non-renewable resources are formed. Thus, the 
intuition behind the model and its extensions is essential when interpreting our 
empirical analysis based on the price divergence between WTI and Brent.  
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Hamilton (2008) surveys crude oil prices in the period between 1970 and 2008. He 
attributes strong growth in demand from emerging economies, coupled with a failure 
of global production to increase, as reasons behind the exuberant rise in oil prices 
since 2000. However, his article does not examine specific crude prices, only general 
crude price movements. A natural extension of Hamilton’s work would be to study 
specific crudes, such as WTI and Brent, seeing as not all exogenous factors move 
crude prices with the same strength. Our thesis will build on Hamilton’s research and 
extend the time period analyzed to capture the shale oil revolution in the U.S., and its 
impact on crude oil prices. 
 
In an extensive research effort by Kilian (2009; 2014), crude oil prices were retrieved 
back to 1975 and decomposed to examine whether historical oil price shocks could 
best be explained by demand or supply conditions. The three-way decomposition 
consisted of (i) crude oil supply shocks (ii) increased aggregated, global demand for 
all industrial commodities and (iii) a preventative increase in demand for crude oil. 
Kilian finds that demand conditions has the largest effect on price fluctuations, both 
in the short and long-term. His findings broke with earlier supposed truisms, that 
supply conditions best could explain oil price movements. In our empirical analysis, 
we use these findings by decomposing the spread to study whether the divergence 
between WTI and Brent can be explained by supply or demand conditions. 
 
In an empirical study of the global crude market, Nordhaus (2009) concludes that the 
crude oil market is integrated, where the sum of total demand and supply and 
inventory levels determine the price. Nordhaus emphasizes the fact that crude oils 
from different geographic regions are largely interchangeable when of similar quality. 
They are as such fungible; shipping the same or similar oil from elsewhere can make 
up for a shortfall in a specific region. However, his findings do not imply that short-
term deviations from a more or less constant long-run relationship between crudes 
signify an ending of a relationship. As Balke and Fomby (1997) observe, due to the 
existence of adjustment and transaction costs, movements toward the long-run 
equilibrium do not occur in a linear fashion or instantaneously. In our work we wish 
to examine if the divergence in the WTI-Brent spread is only a short-term occurrence 
and whether prices are moving back towards their long-term relationship. 
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To examine whether there is a long-term relationship between WTI and Brent prices, 
Reboredo (2011) uses a copula approach. His paper examines the dependence 
structure between crude oil benchmarks, suggesting that crude prices co-move and are 
linked with the same intensity during bear and bull markets. These findings support 
Nordhaus’ (2009) conclusion of the crude oil market being one great pool. However, 
these articles do not examine the reasons behind the co-movements. As WTI and 
Brent have diverged from their long-term price relationship, we extend their research 
and study what affects WTI and Brent prices, and if their relationship has altered.  
 
The claim that the crude market is one globalized pool is backed up by arbitrage 
theory. Several empirical papers (see e.g. Hamilton, 2008; Fattouh, 2011) as well as 
theoretical papers (see e.g. Schwarz & Szakmary, 1994; Al-Loughani & Moosa, 1995; 
Bacon & Tordo, 2005) have supported this claim. Their results indicate that the world 
crude oil market, in the long run, is a large integrated market where prices co-move. 
These results imply that price differences between crude oils should reflect quality 
differences and transportation costs in the long run. The recent divergence between 
WTI and Brent has, at least in the short term, disproved this theory, and we therefore 
examine the factors behind the divergence. 
 
Theoretical research supporting the case for a globalized crude oil market has been 
empirically tested. Fattouh (2009) finds, with the help of standard root tests, that 
crude oil prices cannot deviate without restrictions and are thus linked, confirming the 
globalization theory. One implication of Fattouh’s research is that crudes of similar 
quality in different markets should move in unison such that their spread is more or 
less constant in the long run. He presents a relationship between WTI and Brent built 
on his assumption of the crude oil market being one globalized pool, formally: 
 𝑃!",! + 𝐶!" + 𝐷 = 𝑃!"#,!                                                                                            (1) 
 
Here 𝑃!" and 𝑃!"# are the prices for Brent and WTI at time t, 𝐶!" represents the cost 
of carrying Brent and D is the quality discount. If the WTI-Brent differential is greater 
than zero it will lead to arbitrage, i.e., U.S. refineries will import Brent, and continue 
to do so until the price relationship is again attained. Fatthouh’s findings are in 
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contrast to what has recently occurred in the spread between WTI and Brent, where 
WTI has been sold at a discount to Brent over a prolonged period of time. This has 
led us to postulate a new price relationship between the crudes:  
 𝑃!",! + 𝐶!" + 𝐷 + 𝑆 = 𝑃!"#,!                                                                                     (2) 
 
Based on our hypothesis, we have added a term, S, to capture structural changes in 
North America. In our empirical analysis we will quantify the factors that has affected 
the spread. If these have a significant affect, it will give validation to our extended 
model. 
 
In an earlier paper, Fattouh (2007) claims that the long-term price relationship 
between WTI and Brent started to show signs of weakness already in 2006. He 
implies that pipeline logistics and the insufficient of infrastructure is a significant 
factor in what he terms as a breakdown of the WTI price. Fattouh also highlights the 
fact that Brent is a seaborne crude, as opposed to WTI, and hence does not suffer 
from the same pipeline bottlenecks. However, these findings are not based on 
statistical evidence, but rather on descriptive data on the price movements of WTI. An 
empirical analysis would have strengthened the conclusions of Fattouh. Further, his 
article was written in 2007, and is thus outdated given recent events. We add to 
Fattouh’s observations by formally testing his findings by using cointegration analysis 
to see whether the long-run relationship between WTI and Brent has temporarily 
ended. 
 
In an analysis of the WTI-Brent spread, Büyükşahin et al. (2012) find that WTI has 
periodically traded at what they refer to as unheard of discounts to Brent since the fall 
of 2008. They find structural breaks in the long-term relationship in 2008 and 2010 
and provide empirical evidence using an econometric model where financial and 
macroeconomic variables help predict the observed spread levels. Our thesis builds on 
these structural breaks in the relationship, but use a cointegration approach to 
formally examine if WTI and Brent were in a long-term relationship. We wish to 
empirically test the divergence in the spread by decomposing it into time and 
commodity spreads. We extend their research by testing an updated data sample and 
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quantifying what factors caused the recent price divergence between WTI and Brent. 
In addition we examine whether the two crudes are back in a long-term relationship, 
an occurrence Büyükşahin et al. did not test for. 
  
In the same research paper, they also examined if financial aspects caused a structural 
break between WTI and Brent. Two major indices for commodities, the Standard & 
Poor’s GSCI commodity index and Dow-Jones UBS commodity price index shifted 
its relative crude oil exposure away from WTI over to Brent. These two indices are 
the most widely used benchmarks for commodity index funds, and the shift towards 
Brent caused large money flows from WTI into Brent futures. Büyükşahin et al. finds 
evidence for a structural break in the WTI-Brent spread in December 2010. This 
result is a good indicator for a possible ending of the long-term relationship between 
the two crudes, and their findings lead us to empirically test whether the financial 
market has had a significant effect on the spread between WTI and Brent. 
5. Events that Affects the Oil Price 
As the presented theory and literature has shown, there are several factors that move 
the price of WTI and Brent, both independently and simultaneously. However, the 
theory presented in the literature review can only explain oil price movements up to a 
certain point. We present specific events that affect crude prices. In addition, we also 
present specific events that affect the prices of WTI and Brent individually, as they 
are produced in separate parts of the world, and will thus be influenced by local 
occurrences. These events will be implemented in our empirical research. 
5.1.1 Events that Affect Prices Simultaneously 
Economic growth has a positive effect on all crude prices. In the build-up to the 
financial crisis in 2008, low interest rate policies led to excess liquidity and economic 
growth that put upward pressure on crude prices. With the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the following financial crisis, the sudden evaporation of economic 
growth was followed by a reduction in the price of crude. In our empirical model we 
account for both the U.S. and world economy to control for shifts in economic 
growth. 
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The commodity market is highly linked to stress stemming from global financial 
markets. In times of high levels of financial stress, demand declines leading to 
decreased commodity prices. We control for this in our empirical model by isolating 
fluctuations in demand stemming from financial stress.   
 
Lighter crudes, like WTI and Brent, are usually sold at a premium relative to the 
heavier crudes. This light-heavy spread reflects the yield produced from distillation. 
The fact that lighter products are in higher demand, forces an upward shift in the price 
of lighter crudes in times of tightness in the crude oil markets. This is augmented by 
the fact that spare capacity in the market is mainly from producers of heavy crude. 
They can alleviate the tightness in the market, but not satisfy the demand for lighter 
products. This in sum has the implication of increasing the light-heavy spread in tight 
markets. When decomposing the spread into different components, we examine the 
light-heavy spread between WTI and WTS to study if there are spillover effects from 
the unusual behavior in the WTI-Brent spread. 
 
Certain economies with excess supply of crude keep oil in reserve or adjust 
production for political or economic reasons. OPEC and the U.S. hold reserves to be 
able to have spare capacity on hand for market management. Both reserves are readily 
available and can change supply in the market, altering the price of crudes and 
distillate products in a way the countries see fit. In addition, Saudi Arabia, the largest 
producer in OPEC, adjusts production for political or economic reasons. The U.S. and 
Saudi Arabian crude production, and OPEC spare capacity, is controlled for in our 
empirical model, as they affect prices of both Brent and WTI. 
5.1.2 Events that Influence the Price of WTI  
The growing inflow of crude oil to Cushing, as a response to increased production in 
North America, explained in section 3.1.2, led storage facilities to almost reach peak 
capacity. This has induced the expansion of storage capacity, doubling Cushing’s 
storage to meet the increased production (CME Group, 2010). Additional capacity 
prompted the increased trading of WTI, solidifying Cushing as a trading hub of great 
importance. In addition to the increased capacity, pipelines were built to increase the 
influx of crude. In total, this has managed to alleviate pressure on pipeline 
infrastructure into Cushing and its surrounding storage facilities. 
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However, the production of pipelines to shift crude out of Cushing has not kept the 
same pace. Between 2010 and 2013 capacity for delivering crude to Cushing 
increased significantly due to the construction of pipelines, such as the TransCanada 
Keystone pipeline that originates in Alberta, Canada. The growing supply of crude oil 
to Cushing far surpassed the surrounding refinery and pipeline take-away capacity. 
This has resulted in a bottleneck in Cushing, causing a large build-up of crude and 
depressing the WTI price (Genscape, 2014). We empirically test whether these 
pipeline and capacity issues have had a significant impact on the spread and its 
unusual behavior. 
 
Local weather conditions can also have an effect on the WTI price. The Gulf of 
Mexico and the Southern U.S. has witnessed extreme weather such as hurricanes. In 
2005 hurricanes forced refineries and production sites along the Gulf Coast to shut 
down, which immediately increased the price of WTI as supply dropped (U.S. EIA, 
2014d). As we wish to test for certain supply conditions in North America, we need to 
isolate drops in supply stemming from these weather conditions. We therefore control 
for hurricanes in our empirical model. 
5.1.3 Events that Influence the Price of Brent  
Brent, as opposed to WTI, is a seaborne crude, making it more sensitive to demand 
from global and emerging markets. After Japan shut down its nuclear facilities after 
the Fukushima incident in 2011, their demand for fossil fuel greatly increased. These 
factors put upward pressure on the Brent crude price (The Economist, 2011). In our 
empirical model we account for factors that affect the demand for seaborne crudes, by 
both including the immediate demand for Brent and world economic activity.  
 
The demand for Brent has also been affected by geopolitical situations. With the 
Tunisian revolution and the subsequent political turmoil during the Arab Spring, 
crude oil supplies from these areas have been under risk. The Libyan crisis removed a 
large supply of sweet crude, and the continuing turmoil in other parts of the Middle 
East have put production facilities under duress. As Brent is a close substitute to these 
crudes, this has put upward pressure on the price. In our empirical model, we account 
for political unrest to isolate the fluctuations caused by supply disruptions and the risk 
premium added by investors. 
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6. Stylized Theoretical	  Analysis	  
In the following section we use the theory presented so far and apply it in a theoretical 
framework to easier comprehend why crude prices fluctuate. The focus of our stylized 
theoretical analysis will be on the North American market, as we hypothesized that 
the problems in Cushing have been the main driver behind the divergence between 
WTI and Brent. In the presentation of each scenario, we apply the theoretical 
framework to real life occurrences, which will be a useful backdrop when interpreting 
our empirical analysis in section 7. Before we present our theoretical analysis, we 
address certain assumptions that are inherent throughout all scenarios. 
6.1.1 Assumptions 
The depiction of the crude oil market is static and focuses only on short-term effects. 
In the long run, quality differences and transportation costs determine the price. The 
market for crude is global, with no regional differences. These assumptions are 
supported by previous research, as discussed in the literature review. We further 
assume that the market is perfectly competitive, with no supplier or consumer having 
any form of market power.  
 
Two types of crude oil supply the market. Seaborne crude from the North Sea referred 
to as Brent and landlocked crude sourced in Cushing, referred to as WTI. The price of 
Brent is a proxy for world price in our scenarios. The crudes are assumed to be 
aggregated and thus depict the market as a whole. Due to the small quality differences 
between WTI and Brent, we assume them to be identical products with no switching 
cost for the buyers.  
 
We depict two markets in our theoretical analysis. The first is the inland North 
American market, denoted Landlocked, representing the crude oil market north of 
Cushing. The second market is the market south of Cushing, denoted Seaborne, able 
to utilize WTI, Brent or a combination. 
 
The landlocked crude, WTI, faces capacity constraints from its selling point Cushing 
to the Seaborne market. Pipelines that supply Cushing with oil have enough capacity 
to handle increased supply, whereas the pipelines that transport oil out of Cushing to 
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the Seaborne market does not have the ability to handle increased production. This 
implies that demand for crude in the Seaborne market can only be supplied by WTI 
up until the point of maximum pipeline capacity. The vertical line denoted capacity 
constraint illustrates this.  
 
We illustrate several scenarios to depict how crude oil prices are affected by 
exogenous changes in supply and demand. First we present two scenarios that 
illustrate how supply and demand shocks affect the price of WTI in the Seaborne 
market without the possibility of importing Brent. We subsequently expand both 
scenarios to account for capacity constraints at Cushing. The next scenario depicts the 
Landlocked market’s ability to shift WTI to the Seaborne market, with and without 
capacity constraints. In this scenario we allow for the import of Brent. Finally, we 
present a cost-differential model, where the short-term assumption is eased to 
examine how different modes of transportation to the Seaborne market can affect the 
price and quantity supplied of each crude.  
 
All scenarios are based on the assumption that the market is in equilibrium prior to 
any exogenous change. Furthermore, we assume downward sloping demand 
functions, illustrating the fact that demand falls with rising crude oil prices. The 
supply curve is upward sloping, reflecting increasing costs as output increases. 
 
Table 5 gives an overview of the different scenarios.  
 
Table 5 – Scenarios and Assumptions 
 
 
 
Assumption
Capacity Constraint Without With Without With Without With With
Landlocked Perspective x x x
Seaborne Perspective x x x x x
Isolated Market x x x x
Brent Price Given x x
Demand Shock Two-Region ModelSupply Shock
Long-Term 
Equilibrium
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6.1.2 Demand Shock 
The first scenario illustrates the effect of a positive demand shock to the Seaborne 
market. We assume the market is isolated in that only WTI can be supplied and 
discuss the scenario with and without capacity constraints. The effects are illustrated 
in figure 3. 
 
Without constraints, a positive shock will increase demand for crude oil in the 
Seaborne market, increasing quantity, regardless of price. This relates to a positive 
shift in the demand curve, increasing both the price and quantity demanded of WTI, 
from [Po, Q0] to a new equilibrium [P1, Q1]. 
 
However, with a constraint, the inability to increase supply out of Cushing to the 
Seaborne market will have a feedback-effect on the price. Consumers will outbid each 
other to gain access to the limited supply of WTI crude, increasing its price above 
what would have been the market price without capacity constraints. The price 
increase will continue until the market is again at equilibrium, with higher prices and 
no change in quantity [P2, Q0]. The feedback effect arises because at the quantity 
supplied, marginal willingness to pay is higher than marginal cost. Hence, consumers 
outbid each other until equilibrium is established where marginal cost equals 
willingness to pay.  
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Figure 3 - Demand Shock 
 
The market for WTI has over the last decade experienced increased demand without 
being able to supply the market south of Cushing with crude. The U.S. demand for oil 
has grown almost every year, increasing pressure on Cushing to pump oil to the 
market. Without pipeline expansion from Cushing to refineries on the coast, the 
bottleneck will have the effect of increasing prices for WTI, all else equal.  
6.1.3 Supply Shock  
This scenario depicts the effects of a positive supply shock to the Seaborne market. 
As in the first scenario, we assume that the Seaborne market is isolated and we 
discuss the scenario with and without constraints. The effects of a supply shock are 
illustrated in figure 4. 
 
A positive shock to supply without capacity constraints increases the supply of oil to 
the Seaborne market. The supply curve experiences a positive shift, decreasing prices 
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but increasing the quantity supplied. The market is now in a new equilibrium, moving 
from [P0, Q0] to [P1, Q1]. 
 
With capacity constraint, a supply shock will decrease WTI prices further. Again we 
assume that the market is in equilibrium at [P0, Q0] prior to the supply shock. With 
increased supply of WTI, no increase in demand and a capacity constraint, 
competition between producers will cause a decrease in price. As the increased supply 
into Cushing cannot be supplied to the Seaborne market, competition increases further 
as oil producers with low marginal cost cut prices to keep market shares. This 
feedback effect gives rise to a new equilibrium at [P2, Q0] with the same quantity 
consumed, but at a lower price.  
 
Figure 4 - Supply Shock 
 
WTI has been subject to increased production volumes due to the unconventional oil 
revolution in North America. As a consequence, producers were eager to expand 
pipeline capacity into Cushing, leading to a rush in pipeline construction. Amongst 
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the projects was the Keystone XL pipeline in 2011 (Reuters, 2013). Though pipelines 
leading into Cushing increased, pipeline projects sending oil out were insufficient in 
handling the increased crude volumes. This led to large accumulations of oil at 
Cushing, leading to a depression of the WTI price.  
6.1.4 Capacity Constraints in a Two-Region Model 
In this scenario we depict the Landlocked market’s ability to shift WTI to the 
Seaborne market. The Seaborne market has the possibility of consuming WTI, Brent 
or a combination of the two. We assume that the price of Brent is given, as the 
quantity shifted from the Landlocked to the Seaborne market has little or no impact 
on the world price. It is assumed that the price of Brent is higher than WTI as the glut 
of oil in the Landlocked market has depreciated prices relative to Brent. We will 
discuss the scenario with and without capacity constraints to illustrate the effects of a 
pipeline bottleneck on the WTI price. The initial equilibrium in the Landlocked 
market is [P0, Q0], before we open for the possibility of shifting oil to the Seaborne 
market. All effects are illustrated in figure 5. 
 
Without a constraint on the possibility of shifting oil to the Seaborne market, 
producers of WTI will increase their production until the cost of the marginal 
producer equals the price of Brent. This will lead to an increased production of WTI 
equal to [Q2], with producers being able to charge the world price, [PBrent]. The new 
equilibrium in the Landlocked market is [PBrent, Q1], with producers of WTI supplying 
[Q2-Q1] to the Seaborne market. 
 
If the same scenario is depicted with capacity constraints, the Landlocked market can 
only shift oil to the Seaborne market until maximum capacity. This will constrict the 
supply of WTI to the Seaborne market, having the effect of decoupling WTI and 
world prices. The effect of the constraint is that producers with lower marginal costs 
will decrease prices to stay competitive. With the constraint producers can only 
increase production to [Q4], obtaining price [P1]. This leads to a new equilibrium in 
the Landlocked market [Q3, P1], with the Seaborne market being supplied with [Q4-
Q3] from producers of WTI.  
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Figure 5 - Two-Region Model 
 
This scenario illustrates the price divergence that has occurred in recent years 
between WTI and Brent. With increasing volumes of unconventional oil flowing into 
Cushing, without the same possibility of shifting it to consumers south of Cushing, 
prices diverged. This resulted in an increased inflow of other crudes to the Seaborne 
market to saturate demand. 
6.1.5 Long-Term Equilibrium 
We are also interested in examining the effects of a capacity constraint when the 
short-term assumption is eased and increase the number of transportation alternatives. 
We will look at both the marginal costs of transporting WTI from the Landlocked to 
the Seaborne market and the marginal cost of transporting Brent. The model depicts 
the different marginal cost per barrel to illustrate the price spread. The model itself 
does not predict a price spread between the crudes, but is implied in the transaction. 
We will first depict the short-term market where only pipelines are able to transport 
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WTI, before we ease the short-term assumption and include other means of 
transportation. 
 
The marginal cost of shifting oil through pipelines from the Landlocked to the 
Seaborne market is initially lower than the marginal cost of Brent, reflecting the fact 
that pumping oil through existing pipelines is almost perfectly elastic. However, when 
maximum capacity is reached, the marginal cost curve is kinked 90 degrees, implying 
that supply is perfectly inelastic. As a consequence, producers of WTI can only 
supply [QPipeline] to the Seaborne market in the very short run.  
 
The seaborne Brent has a higher marginal cost than WTI, as new tankers are required 
to transport additional crude. We assume no shortage of oil tankers, as Brent is not 
affected by the same capacity constraints as WTI. For each additional tanker hired, 
the price of carry by sea will rise, increasing marginal costs. 
 
Given these assumptions, producers of WTI can only supply the market with 
[QPipeline], while the producers of Brent supply the remaining demand [QBrent-QPipeline] 
in the very short run. Even if the marginal cost of production for WTI is lower than 
Brent, it is unable to be transported to the coastal market where it can be sold at world 
prices. This is illustrated in figure 6. 
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Figure 6 - Short-Term Equilibrium 
 
By easing the short-term assumption, other modes of transportation can be made 
available for WTI. These modes of transportation have a higher marginal cost than 
pipelines, and are thus only economically viable after the maximum pipeline capacity 
has been reached.  
 
The most common transport alternatives in North America are barges, trucks and rail, 
with each measure having an individual marginal cost function. The cheapest 
alternative is transportation by barge, denoted [MCBarges]. We assume that there is no 
natural capacity constraint on this mode of transportation. Barges experience 
increasing marginal costs at a faster rate than rail, as producers must increase the 
freight rates to employ additional barges. This makes rail the preferred alternative 
after [QBarges]. 
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Railroads also face capacity issues due to natural constraints on infrastructure. As the 
assumption of short-term time horizon has not been eased completely, the 
infrastructure of railway is given, such that the marginal cost becomes completely 
inelastic after capacity is reached. We assume the capacity is reached at [QRailway]. 
After the maximum capacity by rail is reached, producers can choose to transport 
crude by trucks, with its marginal cost denoted [MCTrucks]. The marginal cost for 
trucks increase at a faster rate than the marginal cost of transporting Brent, and as a 
consequence Brent becomes the preferred alternative after the two marginal cost 
curves intersect. 
 
As new modes of transport are made available the quantity of WTI supplied to the 
Seaborne market will increase, but at a higher marginal cost. This is shown by the 
marginal cost curve for WTI, which increases as new modes of transportation are 
introduced. 
 
This illustrates that producers of WTI are unable to earn the rent they could have 
achieved without constraints between the Landlocked and Seaborne market. New 
modes of transport enable the producers of WTI to shift more crude out on the 
Seaborne market, but at a higher marginal cost. This is illustrated in figure 7. 
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Figure 7 - Long-Term Equilibrium 
 
Since 2007 pipelines have been transporting oil at maximum capacity, forcing other 
means of transportation to be considered. According to Forbes Magazine (2014), the 
most common transport alternatives out of Cushing, besides pipeline, are barges, 
trucks and railways, with barges comprising the majority of transport. However, these 
modes of transport come at a higher price. In a report from the Congressional 
Research Service (2014), transportation through pipeline was by far the cheapest with 
marginal costs of $5 per barrel, followed by barges, railway and trucks costing in the 
region of $8-12 per barrel. 
 
The pipeline capacity constraint has in effect revolutionized crude transportation. 
Producers of WTI have been incentivized, by the possibility of arbitrage, to look for 
alternative means of transportation between the market north and south of Cushing. 
The U.S. fleet of over 3,000 inland barges has been pressed into service, shipping oil 
south to the Gulf Coast, lifting day rates and boosting revenues for barge owners. The 
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same effects have also been felt in the railway sector. In 2009, 73% of the crude 
moved out of North Dakota was shipped via pipeline, with only 1% transported by 
rail. In December 2012, however, over 66% of the crude was carried by rail (Brown 
Brothers Harriman, 2013). 
7. Empirical Analysis 
After gaining an understanding of the crude oil market and what affects crude oil 
prices, we turn to our empirical research. In this section we answer our hypotheses by 
the use of econometrical techniques. First we present our sample data, before 
explaining the method behind our econometrical approach. We hypothesized that the 
relationship between WTI and Brent ended in 2010 and that a new relationship was 
established early 2014. We will examine this by the use of an Engle-Granger two-step 
test for cointegration. After this, we decompose the spread into three components to 
further analyze the spread. Lastly, we build an empirical model to quantify the 
different component’s effect on the spread. 
7.1 Data 
Based on our discussion in section 4 and 5, we utilize variables that influence the 
individual prices of WTI and Brent, as well as variables that affect both crudes. All 
prices are specified in U.S. dollars. Our sample data runs from 01/01/2000, as we 
wanted to have a sufficient data sample for inferring causal relationships when testing 
our empirical model. 
 
We use different time annotations in our empirical analysis. For our analysis of the 
relationship of the spread, we utilize daily data, which stretches to 24/10/2014. The 
daily data captures short-term fluctuations in prices and can better pinpoint when the 
relationship between WTI and Brent ended, and if a new relationship has been 
established. We continue using daily data on futures and spot prices for WTI, Brent, 
LLS and WTS in the spread decomposition.  
 
In our empirical model we use weekly data that runs to 27/06/2014, as several of our 
independent variables are only available on a weekly basis. This will not weaken our 
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results, as weekly data manages to capture most of the short-term fluctuations 
(Baumeister, Guérin & Kilian, 2014). 
 
It must be noted that some of our variables are non-stationary. Econometric analysis 
is often built on the assumption that the mean and variance of an underlying process 
are constant. When the time series is non-stationary, this assumption does not hold, 
and can lead to spurious regression results. However, if both dependent and 
independent variables are non-stationary and cointegrated they can be used in 
regressions (Stock & Watson, 2012). We will therefore check all our variables of 
interest for non-stationarity and if they are cointegration with the spread, to see if we 
can apply them in our empirical model. These issues are examined in section 7.5.1. 
7.1.1 Crude Oil Price Data 
We obtain historic spot prices for WTI, Brent, LLS and WTS from Bloomberg 
(2014e). For some assessments we use the futures prices and open interest of WTI and 
Brent, retrieved from Bloomberg (2014c; 2014d) and NYMEX (2014a; 2014b) 
respectively. The open interest can be used to measure the effect of increased demand 
for WTI and Brent futures contracts and the liquidity of the two (The Economic 
Times, 2014). If the open interest increases for a specific crude, it suggests increasing 
demand for this particular crude. This implies that if the open interest increases for 
Brent, without a corresponding in the open interest for WTI, the spread should move 
in favor of Brent. 
7.1.2 Demand Variables 
Because WTI is a landlocked crude oil with its price partly dictated by infrastructure 
logistics, the demand for Brent and WTI are not completely integrated. As there is no 
global aggregate indicator for demand in the commodities market, we use indicators 
for U.S. and world economic activity, as proxies for demand of WTI and Brent 
respectively. 
7.1.2.1 World Economic Activity 
For the world economic activity, we could use gross domestic product (GDP) as an 
approximation. A drawback with GDP is that there are no weekly or monthly 
observations on an aggregated level. In addition, GDP data is smoothed and too broad 
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an index for our purposes, as we are interested in a proxy for the demand for 
commodities. Consequently, these factors contribute to the measure of GDP being an 
imprecise and unsuitable approximation for the world economy. We instead utilize 
the relationship between real economic activity and the demand for shipping, as 
demand for shipping is driven by world economic activity (Klovland, 2002).  
 
Kilian (2009) introduces an index for global economic activity built on single-voyage 
freight rates for bulk dry commodity cargoes and accounts for different fixed effects 
for different routes, commodities and ship sizes. However, the monthly index is not 
updated to fit our needs and we therefore use another proxy for real economic 
activity, the Baltic Dry Index. Sørensen (2009) use the Baltic Dry Index as a proxy for 
real economic activity in his study of oil price shocks and stock return predictability. 
He proves that the relation between Kilian’s Index and the Baltic Dry Index is strong, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.96 in the period between 1985 and 2009.  
 
Even though the indices are built on different data, the correlation indicates that they 
capture similar effects. We use weekly data on the Baltic Dry Index, obtained from 
Bloomberg (2014a). The index captures effects from countries where data is difficult 
to extract. Using measures of economic activity for each individual country would 
require extensive time series data and correct weighing for each country. In addition, 
changes in currencies could lead to measurement errors. The Baltic Dry Index takes 
all these factors into account indirectly, as it accumulates real economic activity 
automatically. If the index increases in strength, the global demand for commodities 
is assumed to be increasing. This again implies that the global economy is 
experiencing an upturn. With increasing global demand, the price of the seaborne 
Brent should increase as well, which infers a reduction in the spread between WTI 
and Brent, all else equal. 
7.1.2.2 The U.S. Economy 
For the U.S. economy we obtain data on the daily ADS index first developed by 
Aruoba, Diebold and Scotti (2008). The index tracks daily business conditions in the 
U.S. by aggregating several underlying economic indicators. Intuitively, a strong 
demand for local crude oil is associated with a strong economy. We therefore expect 
the variable to be positively correlated with the spread between WTI and Brent. The 
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data is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Aruoba, Diebold, & 
Scotti, 2009) and is updated weekly. We convert it from daily to weekly by taking 
averages over each week. 
 
The second variable is the historic data on the New York Stock Exchange Composite 
Index, which consist of all indices traded on the exchange. The data is retrieved from 
New York Stock Exchange (2014b), and used as a proxy for the economic conditions 
in the U.S. The index includes more than 1,500 companies from all sectors of the 
economy (New York Stock Exchange, 2014a), and it is this breadth that makes it a 
good proxy. When the index experiences a prolonged fall one would expect the 
economy to be on the verge of a downturn. 
7.1.2.3 Financial Stress 
To account for elevated levels of financial market stress in our empirical analysis, we 
include the TED spread, obtained from Bloomberg (2014g). The spread is the 
difference between the 30-day U.S. dollar London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
and the 30-day Treasury bill yield. LIBOR provides an indication of the average rate 
at which a LIBOR contributor bank can obtain unsecured funding in the London 
interbank market for a given period and currency (Intercontinental Exchange, 2014). 
The Treasury bill yield is a short-term obligation backed by the U.S. government with 
maturity of less than a year. The bills are issued through a competitive bidding 
process where the appreciation of the bond provides the return to the holder (U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, 2014). The TED spread is thus an indicator of perceived 
credit risk in the general economy.  
 
The variable is included because in periods of high market stress, traders and other 
market participants are less willing to engage in trades and cross-market arbitraging 
(Gromb & Vayanos, 2010). We expect, all else equal, the spread to increase during 
periods of elevated levels of financial stress. 
7.1.3 Supply Variables 
Recognizing that WTI and Brent are not fully integrated we include variables in our 
dataset that can summarize supply balances for WTI and Brent.  
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7.1.3.1 The U.S. Crude Oil Production 
The production of WTI has, unlike Brent, spiked since the shale oil revolution. To 
capture this effect we need to account for the U.S. production of crude. We account 
for this by using the number of operating crude rigs as a proxy for production, 
sourced from Baker Hughes and Weatherford International (2014). The data includes 
all operating crude oil rigs in the U.S., both onshore and offshore. The number of rigs 
has increased as more are put into use in U.S. crude production. This leads us to 
believe that, all else equal, an increase in the number of rotary rigs puts downward 
pressure on the WTI price as more crude oil is supplied to the market. The production 
volumes from the Bakken Field in North Dakota and imported crude from Canada can 
be seen in figure 14 in the appendix, to illustrate the production increase from 
unconventional our sources. 
7.1.3.2 OPEC Surplus Capacity 
Büyüksahin et al. (2011) argued that OPEC historically has tried to maintain a surplus 
production capacity, defined as the volume of production that can be brought online 
within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days (U.S. EIA, 2014d). Over the last 
decade however, global economic growth has increased the demand for crude oil, 
almost exhausting OPEC’s spare capacity, which led to a sharp increase in the world 
oil price. 
 
In this way we can infer that lower energy prices amid greater surplus production 
capacity, reflects a weak macroeconomic environment. This implies that, all else 
equal, there should be an inverse relationship between the price of Brent and the 
OPEC spare capacity, as can be seen in section 10.1.2 in the appendix. 
7.1.3.3 Saudi Arabian Crude Oil Production 
The Saudi Arabian crude oil production is included to capture the general market 
conditions for crudes that are seaborne, such as Brent. Saudi Arabia is of great 
importance in the crude oil market, as it maintains the world’s largest crude oil 
production capacity. This infers that an increase in Saudi Arabian production 
decreases the price of Brent and other seaborne crudes. We collect data on Saudi 
Arabian crude oil production from Bloomberg (2014f). 
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7.1.4 Other Control and Dummy Variables 
7.1.4.1 Currency Fluctuations 
As all crude is traded in dollars we control for fluctuations in the value of the U.S. 
dollar. We do this by including the exchange rate for the U.S. dollar to Euro in our 
empirical analysis, obtained from Bloomberg (2014h). We use the Euro as a proxy for 
the European market, which is a large consumer of Brent. If the dollar value 
increases, all else equal, it would lead to other countries having less purchasing power 
and declining demand Brent. 
7.1.4.2 The Arab Spring 
To control for disruptions in the supply of crude from the Middle East, we include a 
dummy variable for the political unrest caused by the Arab Spring. We date the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring to February 11th 2011 when Hosni Mobarak resigned 
(BBC, 2014). We include a dummy variable, which denotes 0 in the period before the 
Arab Spring and 1 from February 11th 2011. As conflicts in the Middle East are still 
apparent, the dummy is upheld throughout our sample period. The Arab Spring has 
put upward pressure on the price of Brent, as the uncertainty of future supply from 
Middle Eastern producers leads competing crudes, such as Brent, to be in higher 
demand. 
7.1.4.3 Hurricanes 
We also control for extreme weather conditions, specifically hurricanes. According to 
the Energy Information Administration (EIA) hurricanes can affect crude oil prices in 
the U.S. Consequently, we include a dummy variable for all hurricanes in our sample 
period of certain strength, making landfall in the U.S. We assume that hurricanes, all 
else equal, will increase WTI prices, as production facilities are forced to close. 
7.2 Cointegration 
In this section we set out to answer our hypotheses regarding the long-term 
relationship of the WTI-Brent spread. We hypothesized that the relationship ended 
early 2010, and that the two crudes were back in a new relationship in 2014. The data 
analyzed are historic futures for WTI and Brent. 
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To formally test our hypotheses, we analyze our sample data with the use of an Engle-
Granger two-step test for cointegration. Cointegration is a statistical property of time 
series variables, where two or more time series are cointegrated if they share a 
common stochastic drift (Engle & Granger, 1987). We will use a technique, in 
combination with the Engle-Granger test, called recursive analysis, to pinpoint when 
the relationship may have ended and returned. We first introduce the Engle-Granger 
test and the recursive analysis before presenting our results. In addition, we test the 
structural validity of our findings by carrying out robustness checks. 
7.2.1.1 Engle-Granger Cointegration Test 
The Engle-Granger two-step test for cointegration examines whether two variables 
are in a cointegrated relationship. To conduct the Engle-Granger test the individual 
price series must be non-stationary and the differentiated price series stationary. A 
stationary time series has a constant probability distribution over time, which implies 
that the correlation between two variables is the same, independent of time 
(Wooldridge, 2012). For non-stationary time series the effects of exogenous shocks 
will not be reduced as a function over time. This can lead to spurious regression 
results. The first step of the Engle-Granger test confirms that the assumptions for 
cointegration are fulfilled. 
 
A Dickey-Fuller test is used to examine if a time series is non-stationary, in other 
words, if the process has a unit root. The following explanation of the test uses the 
WTI price as reference. Starting from an autoregressive order of one process: 
 𝑊𝑇𝐼! = 𝑎! + 𝑝𝑊𝑇𝐼!!! + 𝑒!         (3) 
 
The process has a unit root if p=1. In that case, we know that test-statistics from this 
process is not valid. The Dickey-Fuller test examines if the process has unit root by 
transforming the model, subtracting 𝑊𝑇𝐼!!! from both sides of the equation. Because 
of this transformation, the null hypothesis will also be transformed and is now: 
 𝐻!:  𝛾 = 𝑝 − 1 = 0                                            (4) 𝐻!:  𝛾 = 𝑝 − 1 < 0  
 
  
47 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the time series is said to have a unit root and is 
thus non-stationary. If the null hypothesis holds, there will be no further information 
in the lagged observations of the variable. The test statistic has an asymptotic 
distribution called the Dickey-Fuller distribution. We can reject the null hypothesis if 
the test statistic is of lesser value than the critical value of the distribution.  
 
We can augment the Dickey-Fuller test by adding lagged changes of the variable in 
the regression. To get a valid test statistic, 𝑊𝑇𝐼!!! is subtracted from both sides of the 
equation, resulting in the following equation on augmented form (Wooldridge, 2012): 
 ∆𝑊𝑇𝐼! = 𝛼! + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝑊𝑇𝐼!!! + 𝛿∆𝑊𝑇𝐼!!!!!!! + 𝑒!        (5) 
 
Here 𝛼! is the intercept, 𝑡 controls the trend, 𝛾𝑊𝑇𝐼!!! is the first lag of the time 
series, while 𝛿∆𝑊𝑇𝐼!!!!!!!  is the sum of lags for the first differences where z 
denotes the total number of differences. In cases with autocorrelation, further lags of 
the dependent variable can help reduce the problem. The conclusions drawn on the 
basis of these results are more robust than standard Dickey-Fuller tests, since results 
are less affected by autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2012). 
 
In the second step of the Engle-Granger test, the time series are tested for 
cointegration. If two variables are integrated of order one I(1), then in general the 
linear difference between them is also integrated of order one. The difference between 
the two variables can be shown as: 
 𝑊𝑇𝐼! − 𝛽𝑥! = 𝑒!                                            (6) 
 
In certain cases this difference is stationary, denoted I(0), for some values of 𝛽. If this 
is the case the variables are cointegrated, with 𝛽 as a cointegration parameter. This 
implies that the variables share a stochastic trend and never diverge or converge over 
time (Wooldridge, 2012). The null and alternative hypothesis is:  
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𝐻!: 𝑒! = 𝛽′𝑊𝑇𝐼!~𝐼(1)  (𝑁𝑜𝑡  𝑐𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)           (7)                                                    𝐻!: 𝑒! = 𝛽′𝑊𝑇𝐼!~𝐼(0)  (𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)  
7.2.1.2 Recursive Analysis  
Long economic time series often experience breaks or structural changes due to shifts 
in market fundamentals or production technology (Dahl, Oglend, Osmundsen, & 
Sikveland, 2011). Several tests have been developed to identify these breaks, one of 
which is the recursive analysis suggested by Bai and Perron (1998; 2003). 
 
The technique starts from a designated point in the sample data and re-estimates the 
model each time an observation is added. The model can be Ordinary Least Squares 
or another econometric specification. To establish whether a break in the long-run 
relationship between WTI and Brent occurred and if a new relationship has been 
formed we use the second step of the Engle-Granger test as our model. We collect the 
absolute value of the test-statistics every time the recursive analysis is run and 
compare them with the absolute critical values.  
7.2.2 Ending of the Relationship 
In this sub-section we establish if and when the long-run relationship ended between 
WTI and Brent. Based on our first hypothesis explained in section 2, we believe the 
relationship ended early 2010, thus we obtain test-statistics from mid-2009 to mid-
2010. We first run the recursive analysis on our sample data, before validating our 
findings with the use of the Engle-Granger two step test for cointegration. 
7.2.2.1 Results from the Recursive Analysis 
Since we are only using the second step of the Engle-Granger test for cointegration, 
we are not able to test all Engle-Granger assumptions specified in section 7.2.1.1. The 
recursive analysis is therefore a preliminary test to uncover if there is a break in the 
relationship. We will start the recursive analysis in July 2009, and run the test until we 
find the period at which we can no longer discard our null hypothesis, that the prices 
are not in a cointegrated relationship, at a 90% level of significance. Figure 8 
illustrates the results.  
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Figure 8 - Recursive Analysis 2009-2010 
 
We see that the t-statistic for the Engle-Granger test is significant at the 95% level at 
the start of our designated sample period. However, it decreases in value towards our 
hypothesized end period, and is not significant at the 90% level at the beginning of 
January 2010.  
 
From these preliminary results we surmise that the cointegrated relationship between 
WTI and Brent was no longer statistically significant at the 90% level around the first 
few weeks of January 2010. With the proposed break period we need to check if all 
assumptions of the Engle-Granger test hold for the time period designated by the 
recursive analysis. The next section will explore the properties of our findings. 
7.2.2.2 Results from the Engle-Granger Test 
We wish to confirm our findings in the recursive analysis and thus divide the data into 
two sub-samples, one sample containing data before the postulated break period and 
one sample containing data after. The results for the Engle-Granger test are presented 
stepwise. 
 
The results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test are presented in table 6. 
The test is conducted on the two sub-samples based on our postulated break period. 
The optimal number of lags has been chosen on the basis of the Akaike Information 
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Criterion since it is most suited for the ADF-test (Stock & Watson, 2012). For details 
on the Akaike Information Criterion, see appendix section 10.1.3. 
 
The test statistics and critical values are presented for both Brent and WTI in each of 
the respective periods. If the test statistic is of a lower value than the critical value it 
implies that the null hypothesis can be discarded and that the time series are 
stationary. If, on the other hand, the test statistic is of a higher value we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis and the time series are deemed non-stationary.  
 
Table 6 - Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis is consistent for all time periods and both crudes: the test statistics for 
futures is of a higher value than the 10% critical value, implying that we cannot reject 
our null hypothesis of non-stationary time series at the 90% level of significance. By 
being of a higher value than the 10% critical value it is by default higher than the 5% 
and 1% critical value. For example, the test statistic for the WTI futures for the 
sample period 2000-2010 is –1.185  while the 10% critical value is –2.57 and the 1% 
value is –3.43.  
 
For the differentiated price series, test statistics for both sub-samples are below the 
1% critical value, which indicates that we can reject our null hypothesis of non-
stationary time series at the 99% level of significance. This infers that the time series 
are stationary. 
 
Futures WTI Brent WTI Brent
Number of lags 6 11 7 3
Test statistic -1.185 -1.161 -2.528 -1.914
Differentiated
Number of lags 12 12 12 2
Test statistic -12.298 -12.108 -9.73 -20.708
Critical values
10 %
5 %
1 %
-2.86 -2.86
-3.43 -3.43
2000-2010 2010-2014
-2.57 -2.57
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From the results of the ADF test we can surmise that both assumptions for the Engle-
Granger test holds. This implies that we can use the Engle-Granger to examine if the 
prices for Brent and WTI are cointegrated, i.e., share a common trend. We run the 
second step of the Engle-Granger test to support our results from the recursive 
analysis.  
 
In the second step of the Engle-Granger test we estimate the 𝛽 by the use of Ordinary 
Least Squares. To formally test the cointegration relationship, we postulate a linear 
relationship between WTI and Brent. The residuals from the price relationship are 
tested to assess whether they are stationary. If the null hypothesis of non-stationary 
residuals is discarded, there is evidence for a stationary relationship between the 
variables, signifying that the time series are cointegrated. 
 
Table 7 - Second Step Engle-Granger 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 presents the results from the second step of the Engle-Granger test for both 
sub-periods. If the test statistic is of a lesser value than the critical value we can reject 
the null hypothesis and imply that the two crude oil futures are cointegrated, i.e., 
share a common trend. The test statistic for the sub-sample 2000-2010 is –8.647, 
below the 1% critical value of –3.9. This indicates that the prices were cointegrated in 
the period leading up to our hypothesized break in the long-term relationship. 
However, for the second sub-sample from 2010 to 2014 the test statistic is of a higher 
value than the 10% critical value. This implies that we cannot reject our null 
hypothesis of non-stationary residuals at the 90% level of significance. 
 
The results displayed from the Engle-Granger test confirm, at the 99% level, that the 
prices were cointegrated before our postulated break period. We could not, however, 
Futures WTI Brent WTI Brent
Test statistic
Critical Values
10 %
5 %
1 %
-3.051-3.046
2000-2010 2010-2014
-8.647 -3.050
-3.338 -3.345
-3.900 -3.913
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reject our null hypothesis of non-cointegration at the 90% level of significance after 
the postulated break period.  
7.2.2.3 Robustness Check 
We test the structural validity of our findings by carrying out a robustness check. The 
robustness check will follow the same recursive Engle-Granger procedure as 
explained in section 7.2, but we will alter certain parameters by switching from 
futures to spot prices. The spot and futures markets are highly linked, as discussed in 
section 3.3.1, and should therefore provide similar results. The results will give us an 
indication of the structural validity of our results.  
 
We use the same recursive analysis as with futures, and again we conclude that we 
could not reject our null hypothesis at the 90% level of significance. However, using 
spot prices, the analysis suggests that the relationship ends in late April as opposed to 
the beginning of January. 
 
To check if the assumptions for the Engle-Granger test are satisfied we run an ADF 
test for the whole sample set, on spot and differentiated prices. The assumptions for 
the Engle-Granger test are all satisfied. The spot price time series could not reject the 
null hypothesis at the 90% level of significance and the differenced time series were 
deemed stationary. All relevant tables can be found in section 10.1.4 of the appendix.  
 
The lag in the ending of the relationship when applying spot prices can be explained 
by the fact that futures contracts react to short-term changes faster than spot prices. 
Spot prices are more influenced by current physical market conditions and less by 
future expectations (Reichsfeld & Roache, 2011). Due to this, we reason that there is 
a natural lag in the break date for spot prices. The fact that spot prices show the same 
results as futures prices adds strength to our results. 
7.2.3 Return of the Relationship 
We have already established that WTI and Brent were cointegrated before our 
postulated break date and that the relationship between the crudes was not significant 
at the 90% level after 2010. Now we are interested in examining if the long-term 
relationship between the two crudes has returned. As stated in our first hypothesis, we 
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believe that the relationship was established again in early 2014. Again, we use the 
recursive Engle-Granger analysis to discover if the prices are in a cointegrated 
relationship. We first run the recursive analysis, before validating our findings with 
the Engle-Granger test. 
7.2.3.1 Results from the Recursive Analysis  
We hypothesized that WTI and Brent have moved back in a long-term relationship. 
To test this we perform the recursive analysis with the second step of the Engle-
Granger test for futures prices, starting from September 2013. The results are 
illustrated in figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 - Recursive Analysis 2013-2014 
 
The test statistic for the Engle-Granger test is of a lower value than the 10% critical 
value at the start of our sample period, but becomes significant at both the 90% and 
95% level for the first time around the start of December 2013. However, this is only 
a temporary occurrence, with the time series not being significant at the 90% level a 
few weeks later. The test statistics become significant again at the 95% level at the 
start of 2014 and stays significant throughout the sample period. This leads us to infer 
that a new cointegrated relationship has been formed between WTI and Brent around 
January 2014. Again we need to check if all Engle-Granger assumptions hold for the 
time period in question. The next section explores the properties of our findings. 
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7.2.3.2  Results from the Engle-Granger Test 
Through the recursive analysis we found evidence for the prices to be in a new 
cointegrated relationship from 2014. We run the first and second step of the Engle-
Granger test for the time period found in the recursive analysis to confirm that all 
assumptions hold. 
 
The results from the ADF test are presented in table 8. Again we use the Akaike 
Information Criterion for optimal number of lags. 
 
Table 8 – Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
 
We can confirm that the sample-series for both WTI and Brent fulfill the Engle-
Granger assumptions, with the price series of Brent’s test statistic being 1.462 
whereas the 10% critical value is –2.573. We therefore do not discard the null 
hypothesis of non-stationary at the 90% level. For the differentiated series, the test 
statistic is of a lower value than the 1% critical value. We can thus discard the null 
hypothesis and state that the differentiated time series are stationary at the 99% level 
of significance. We continue with the second step of the Engle-Granger test to support 
our results found in the recursive analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Futures WTI Brent
Number of lags 4 2
Test statistic 0.476 1.462
Differentiated
Number of lags 5 12
Test statistic -5.099 -4.187
Critical values
10 %
5 %
1 %
-2.883
-3.476
2014
-2.573
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Table 9 - Second Step Engle-Granger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 presents the second step of the Engle-Granger test for our sample series 
where we find the relationship to be cointegrated at the 95% level of significance. 
When we set January 2014 as the start of our sample period we obtain a test statistic 
of –3.402, while the 5% critical value is –3.367. This supports our findings from the 
recursive analysis; the two prices are in a new, cointegrated relationship.  
7.3 Spread Decomposition  
After confirming that the spread’s behavior has significantly altered the relationship, 
this section sets out to explain why the long-term relationship between WTI and Brent 
has ended. We hypothesized that supply conditions at Cushing depressed WTI prices 
and thus ended the relationship. We decompose the overall spread into time and 
commodity spreads to answer our hypothesis. As an extension, we examine if there 
has been spillover effects from the unusual behavior in the spread on other crudes. 
 
By utilizing historical spot prices for LLS and WTS, as well as historical futures and 
spot prices for Brent and WTI, we can start to ascertain the reasons behind the price 
divergence. We decompose the historical futures spread for WTI and Brent as 
follows: 
 𝑊𝑇𝐼! − 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡! = 𝑊𝑇𝐼! − 𝐿𝐿𝑆! + 𝐿𝐿𝑆! − 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡! − (𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡! − 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡!)       (8) 
 
A subscript of one or zero denotes historical futures and spot prices respectively. 
These underlying commodity and time spreads can be used to determine whether the 
spread is reacting to demand or supply conditions on WTI or Brent. The 
decomposition will be further explained in the following sections.  
Futures WTI Brent
Test statistic
Critical Values
10 %
5 %
1 %
-3.367
-3.952
-3.402
-3.066
2014
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7.3.1 The Landlocked Commodity Spread 
The landlocked commodity spread, 𝑊𝑇𝐼! − 𝐿𝐿𝑆! ,  captures the part of the spread 
attributable to short-term conditions at Cushing, such as the possible difficulties of 
transporting crude from Cushing to the Gulf Coast. It captures supply conditions for 
the North American market, as excess storage and transportation difficulties affect 
suppliers of WTI. This decomposition is based on the fact that LLS is of similar 
quality to WTI, but LLS is seaborne. 
7.3.2 The Transatlantic Commodity Spread 
The Transatlantic commodity spread,   𝐿𝐿𝑆! − 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡! , captures the cost of shipping 
light sweet crude across the Atlantic. The spread captures demand conditions as a 
positive spread, signaling high transportation costs, leads to decreased demand for 
Brent. A positive WTI-Brent spread, above transportation costs, would signal that the 
import of Brent is profitable for U.S. refineries. The intuition is that the only 
difference between LLS and Brent should be transportation costs, as both crudes are 
seaborne and are of similar quality. 
7.3.3 The Brent Nearby Time Spread 
The Brent nearby time spread, 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡! − 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡! ,   captures the immediacy of 
demand for Brent. A positive spread implies a positive future demand for Brent and 
thus increased prices above the cost of carry. This implies that the time spread is only 
going to have an impact when the forward curve does not reflect the cost of carry. The 
idea is that the nearby futures prices capture the immediate demand for Brent. If the 
nearby time spread increases, one should expect the price of Brent to increase relative 
to WTI in near future. 
7.3.4 Factors Behind the Spread 
The three abovementioned spreads can be used to break down the WTI-Brent spread 
to illustrate the ending of the long-term relationship. There are a plethora of reasons 
behind the movements in crude prices, and with the three decomposed spreads we 
start to examine these reasons in more detail. Figure 10 illustrates all three 
decomposed spreads, as well as the WTI-Brent spread for the entire sample period. 
  
57 
 
Figure 10 - Spread Decomposition 2000-2014 
 
Prior to the financial crisis all spreads fluctuated around zero, with the first major 
spikes emerging around the time of the financial crisis. That major variations occurred 
during the financial crisis is not unexpected, as crude oil prices plummeted, with 
Brent being traded at a 60% discount during the crisis relative to pre-crisis levels 
(Bolton, 2014). However, the financial crisis is not a period of special interest to us, 
as it was a period with extreme volatility in commodity prices.   
 
After the financial crisis, the first fluctuations in the spread decompositions appeared 
early 2010. Both the WTI-Brent spread and the landlocked commodity spread 
experienced adverse development from their previous movements. To further study 
the spread we depict the period following the financial crisis in figure 11. 
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Figure 11 - Spread Decomposition 2010-2014 
 
Depicting the time period after the financial crisis gives a clearer picture of the spread 
decompositions’ divergence from previous trends. As noted, the WTI-Brent spread 
and the landlocked commodity spread are closely correlated. This could imply that the 
inability for crude to be sent out of Cushing has had a negative effect on the WTI-
Brent spread. In late 2013 the transatlantic commodity spread fell around the same 
time as the landlocked commodity spread rose. This might explain why the spread 
continued its negative development before returning to more normal levels.  
 
To further analyze the decomposed spreads, we examine summary statistics, 
presented in section 10.1.5 in the appendix. The mean of the WTI-Brent spread falls 
almost $12 per barrel in the period after 2010, indicating that some significant factor 
or factors have affected it.  
 
One of these factors could be the landlocked commodity spread, with its mean 
decreasing $10 after the break in the relationship. The spread was negative, both prior 
to, and after the break. This could be due to pipeline issues at Cushing, depressing the 
WTI price as competition increased among suppliers, as shown in our theoretical 
analysis in section 6. In addition, LLS is a seaborne crude, and thus experienced no 
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such constraints. The bottleneck could have distorted demand for WTI in favor other 
sweet crudes, increasing the price of LLS.  
 
After the new relationship was established in 2014, the mean increases by $8, but still 
has a negative sign. As explained earlier, both storage capacity and pipeline 
infrastructure at Cushing were expanded, easing the pressure on Cushing’s ability to 
shift oil out to the market. We believe this had an impact on the spread, as more crude 
could now be transported out to the U.S. market. 
 
The transatlantic commodity spread also falls after 2010. Prior to the break there was 
a higher cost of transportation, as can be seen from the Baltic Dry Index in section 
10.1.6 of the appendix. The intuition is that increased demand for shipping will lead 
transportation costs to rise. Consequently, all else equal, Brent as a seaborne crude 
faces higher transportation costs to foreign markets, leading refineries and other 
consumers of crude in the U.S. to prefer geographically closer crudes. The high 
transportation costs made LLS trade at a premium relative to Brent.  
 
After the financial crisis, shipping costs were reduced and stayed low for the whole 
sample period. This implies a lower cost of transportation for Brent, making it a more 
viable crude for producers of finished petroleum products in the U.S. This could have 
extended the unusual spread between WTI and Brent. We see a further reduction in 
the transatlantic commodity spread after the new relationship is established. This 
would imply, all else equal, that the cost of shipping was further reduced, increasing 
the demand for Brent. The Baltic Dry Index has fallen throughout 2014, which 
supports this theory. But the fall in the transatlantic commodity spread is less 
significant than the increased landlocked commodity spread, indicating that the 
reduced pressure at Cushing had a greater effect than the reduced cost of shipping. 
This can be inferred from the values of the means, where the reduction in the 
transatlantic commodity spread is $6 lower than the increase in the landlocked 
commodity spread. 
 
The Brent nearby time spread does not change sign or strength across the sub-
samples. This is somewhat surprising, as factors such as the Arab Spring should have 
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had an effect on Brent prices. However, demand for Brent has not changed 
significantly during the sample period, which leads us to surmise that there must be 
other factors that have kept the demand for Brent at a stable level. The fact that Brent 
has not experienced changes in demand strengthens the evidence for landlocked 
conditions and transportation costs being the major drivers behind the WTI-Brent 
spread. 
 
We continue our analysis of the decomposed spreads by examining the correlations 
between the spread and decompositions, shown in table 10. 
 
Table 10 - Spread Correlations 
Spread 2000-2010 2010-2014 2014 
Total Spread 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    
Landlocked 0.647 0.911 0.498 
Transatlantic 0.349 0.361 0.584 
Brenttime -0.118 0.217 0.116 
 
The correlation between the WTI-Brent spread and the landlocked commodity spread 
is 0.911 between 2010 and 2014. While it is not sufficient to state that there is a 
causal relationship, the correlation coefficient does indicate that there is a strong 
relationship between them. We hypothesized that supply side issues stemming from 
pipeline infrastructure at Cushing has had a significant impact on the spread, and the 
correlation coefficient supports our theory. We know from previous literature, as 
explained in section 4, that the landlocked problems facing WTI were apparent before 
our postulated break, and this is supported by the correlation coefficient between 2000 
and 2010. After the new relationship was established, the correlation coefficient 
decreases significantly. We surmise this to stem from the new pipelines out of 
Cushing that helped alleviate some of the pipeline pressure that was present between 
2010 and 2014. 
 
The correlation between the Brent nearby time spread and the WTI-Brent spread is 
positive both during and after the break, but decreases somewhat in value. We 
postulate this decrease to stem from a greater effect on WTI from global demand after 
the pipeline bottleneck in Cushing eased. In the period leading up to the break the 
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correlation coefficient is negative. This stems from growing demand for crude in 
emerging markets, which had a large impact on Brent, as explained in section 5.1.3.  
 
It is also apparent that the correlation coefficient for the transatlantic commodity 
spread increases after the revival of the spread relationship. A cause for this increase 
could be that after the capacity issues have subsided and the new relationship 
established, the relative effect of transportation costs increases, as the landlocked 
effects have been reduced. This implies that as more oil can be supplied from 
Cushing, other effects might have had a relatively larger impact on the spread. 
7.3.5 The West Texas Crude Quality Spread 
The West Texas crude quality spread, 𝑊𝑇𝐼! −𝑊𝑇𝑆! , is not a part of the spread 
itself. It is, however, included to examine if constraints in supply and demand that 
affect the WTI-Brent spread has had spillover effects on the prices of other crudes, 
like WTS. Both crudes are delivered at Cushing with WTI being priced at a premium 
due to its higher quality. This quality spread has historically been at an almost 
constant level.  
 
From figure 12 we can infer that the quality spread is no longer at a constant 
differential. The increasing differential comes from the fact that lighter products are in 
higher demand than heavier products, and that not all refineries can handle the heavier 
crude, as explained in section 5.1.1. With the bottleneck in Cushing leading to 
increased competition amongst WTI suppliers and increased imports of other light 
crudes, it leads to a depreciation of the WTS price. As seen in the transatlantic 
commodity spread, the cost of carry by sea has fallen, which could, all else equal, 
increase import of light sweet crudes. In addition, refiners want to sell refined 
products from lighter crudes first as they can gain a premium compared to refined 
products from the lower quality WTS, which carry a higher refinery cost. All of these 
factors could have led to the further depreciation of the WTS price, with the WTI-
WTS spread only returning to normal levels when supply conditions at Cushing have 
improved. 
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Figure 12 - Total and West Texas Crude Quality Spread 
 
As more premium crudes are made available the lesser quality WTS is squeezed out 
of the market. The mean for the quality spread in the sample period from 2014 
confirms this, with the spread increasing from $3.12 to $6.92 as seen in section 10.1.5 
in the appendix. What is also interesting is that the volatility of the spread has 
increased between 2010 and 2014. This implies that after the ending of the long-term 
relationship between WTI and Brent, short-term changes in demand and supply 
affected the spread to a greater degree than before. The volatility decreases in 2014, 
signaling that the fluctuations in the WTI-WTS spread decreases as infrastructure 
issues are resolved and the volatility of the total spread is reduced.  
 
From these findings we can deduce that there have been spillover effects related to the 
unusual behavior in the WTI-Brent spread. These spillover effects have increased the 
spread between WTI and WTS, which historically has been traded at a near constant 
rate. 
7.4 Summing Up: Cointegration and Decomposition 
We wished to examine if the long-term relationship between WTI and Brent had 
ended. Through a recursive analysis with the Engle-Granger two-step test for 
cointegration we could no longer reject our null hypothesis, at a 90% level of 
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significance, at the start of 2010. This implies that the times series were not 
cointegrated from this period. Our robustness test on spot prices for the same sample 
period supported our initial findings.  
 
We also examined if the spread had converged and were back in a new cointegrated 
relationship. Several factors, like pipeline expansions out of Cushing, pointed to this. 
By using the same recursive technique as when establishing the break, we could reject 
our null hypothesis at the 95% level of significance, and infer that the crudes had 
moved back into a cointegrated relationship at the beginning of January 2014.  
 
We were interested in uncovering why the spread had diverged, and utilized the 
crudes LLS and WTS to decompose the spread into time and commodity spreads. We 
know from our stylized theoretical analysis in section 6 that a capacity constraint can 
have the effect of diverging crude prices. Our study of the decomposed spreads 
implied that this was the case, and that supply side factors at Cushing could have 
caused the spread’s divergence. In addition, we also found evidence for the 
transatlantic commodity spread, a proxy for shipping costs, to have prolonged the 
divergence between the WTI and Brent. 
7.5 Empirical Findings 
In our cointegration analysis in section 7.2, we put forth evidence that the long-term 
relationship between WTI and Brent temporarily ended through the use of an Engle-
Granger test. Now we extend our analysis to examine if there is statistical evidence 
for our physical and financial factors of interest to have impacted the WTI-Brent 
spread. We build an empirical model to test and quantify our findings from the spread 
decomposition.  
7.5.1 Assumptions 
Before we can perform an empirical analysis there are certain assumptions that must 
be in place. Our empirical model must fulfill the Gauss-Markov assumptions to 
produce the best linear unbiased estimators of the population parameters (Wooldridge, 
2012). These assumptions are explained in detail in section 10.1.7 of the appendix. 
Due to our large sample data, from 2000 to mid-2014, we rely on the central limit 
theorem for our normality assumption. The central limit theorem states that the mean 
  
64 
of a large number of independent random variables will be approximately normally 
distributed, regardless of the underlying distribution (Stock & Watson, 2012).  
 
To correct for potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in our sample data we 
use Newey-West standard errors, explained in section 10.1.8 of the appendix. The 
Newey-West standard errors are dependent on the number of lags chosen to correct 
for autocorrelation. We select 4 lags, as we are using weekly data and want to capture 
correlation within a month. 
 
In section 7.2, we established that futures for WTI and Brent were non-stationary. It is 
therefore necessary to ascertain if the spread itself is also non-stationary, as non-
stationary time series can produce spurious regression results (Woolridge, 2012). We 
use the ADF test described in section 7.2.1.1 to check for non-stationarity. We find 
the spread to be non-stationary, as seen in table 11. This implies that we can obtain 
spurious regression results. 
 
However, if two non-stationary time-series are cointegrated, it is possible to run 
regressions on them without the fear of spurious results (Woolridge, 2012). We 
therefore run the Engle-Granger two-step test for cointegration, explained in section 
7.2.1.1, on our independent variables of interest. Based on our hypotheses and earlier 
findings, our independent variables of interest are the landlocked commodity spread, 
the transatlantic commodity spread, the Brent nearby time spread and the open 
interest for WTI and Brent. The results are presented in table 11. 
   
Table 11 – Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Engle-Granger Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Engle-granger
Variable Lags T-statistic T-statistic
Spread 21 -1.502 N/A
Landlock 39 -1.859 -10.456
Transatlantic 23 -1.978 -4.998
Brenttime 10 -7.183 -2.699
Brent Open Interest 40 0.164 -9.626
WTI Open Interest 40 -1.44 -4.75
ADF
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With the exception of the Brent nearby time spread, all variables are integrated order 
of one I(1). The Engle-Granger test is run with the spread as the corresponding 
variable, so that the Engle-Granger test statistic for the WTI-Brent spread is not 
applicable. 
 
We find that our variables of interest are non-stationary and cointegrated with the 
spread. From the results we can infer that the Brent nearby time spread and the WTI-
Brent spread is not cointegrated, and thus we include it in our model for control 
purposes only. The fact that our variables of interest are cointegrated with the spread 
allows us to run a regression on these variables without fear of spurious regression 
results. We wish to establish to what degree the independent variables of interest have 
had in the development of the spread, and therefore utilize a Chow test. 
 
A Chow test is a test of whether the coefficients in two linear regressions on different 
data sets are equal. We test if our two sub-samples follow the same regression 
function, specifically if our variables of interest change after the relationship between 
WTI and Brent end in 2010. We test this by creating a dummy variable equal to one 
after the relationship ended. We then interact the dummy with all variables of interest. 
Formally our empirical model becomes:       
  𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽!𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐 + 𝛽!𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡+ 𝛽!𝑊𝑇𝐼𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿!  𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 + 𝛿! 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘+   𝛿! 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐 ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 + 𝛿! 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘+ 𝛿!(𝑊𝑇𝐼𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘)+ 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑢! 
         
Where the variable break is the indicator variable for when the cointegrated 
relationship between WTI and Brent ended. All variables of interest are interacted 
with our dummy variable to capture the effects on the spread after the break. The 
corresponding null and alternative hypothesis is: 
 𝐻!:  𝛿! = 𝛿! = 𝛿! = 𝛿! = 𝛿! = 0                   𝐻!:  𝛿! = 𝛿! = 𝛿! = 𝛿! = 𝛿! ≠ 0        
 
(9) 
(10) 
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If the null hypothesis is rejected, the interaction variables have significant explanatory 
power on the spread. 
7.5.2 Regression Results 
With the necessary assumptions fulfilled, we run a regression on our sample data to 
uncover if our variables of interest have had significant explanatory power on the 
WTI-Brent spread. We run regressions with and without the control variables. The 
results for our variables of interest are presented in table 12, while the full regression 
is presented in section 10.1.11 in the appendix. We do not interpret the coefficients on 
our control variables, as they are not of interest in answering our hypotheses. As can 
be seen from the table, the coefficients change in value and level of significance when 
we include our control variables, which imply that Model 1 has omitted variable bias. 
Consequently, we use the regression results from Model 2, where all variables are 
included, to test our hypotheses. 
Table 12 - Regression Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Landlock   0.839***   0.770***
(0.0497) (0.0624)
Landlock Interaction   0.127**    0.197***
(0.0514) (0.0686)
Transatlantic   0.742***    0.599***
(0.0668) (0.102)
Transatlantic Interaction   0.242***    0.362***
(0.0725) (0.110)
Brenttime    -0.0605***    -0.0605***
(0.0216) (0.0222)
Brent Open Interest 0.00144 0,00214
(0.00156) (0.00157)
Brent Open Interest Interaction  0.00387 0,00352
(0.00329) (0.00232)
WTI Open Interest 0,0019 0,00169
(0.00118) (0.00110)
WTI Open Interest Interaction -0,00123 -0,000999
(0.00162) (0.00154)
Break Dummy  -1.078*   -1.340*
(0.608) (0.785)
Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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We test whether the individual coefficients and the full set of interaction terms are 
significant by utilizing T- and F-tests, explained in section 10.1.9 of the appendix. To 
test if our null hypothesis holds and the same model applies, both before and after the 
break, we run a Chow test on the interaction terms, as explained in section 7.5.1. 
Formally we examine the following null hypothesis: 
 𝐻!:Break = (Landlock ∗ Break) = (Transatlantic ∗ Break) =(Brent  open  interest ∗ Break) = (WTI  open  interest ∗ Break) = 0             
 𝐻!:Break = (Landlock ∗ Break) = (Transatlantic ∗ Break) =(Brent  open  interest ∗ Break) = (WTI  open  interest ∗ Break) ≠ 0             
 
From the test we retrieve an F-statistic of 3.26 with a coherent P-value of 0.0064. 
Based on these results we can discard the null hypothesis and infer that the same 
model does not apply; i.e., the coefficients change significantly after the ending of the 
long-term relationship.  
 
We are also interested in testing the coefficients on our variables and interaction terms 
individually. From the regression results we obtain and calculate their individual t-
statistics and corresponding P-values. Table 13 presents the results. 
 
Table 13 – T-statistics and P-values 
Variables t-statistic P-value 
Landlock 12.34 0 
Landlock Interaction 2.88 0.004 
Transatlantic 5.85 0 
Transatlantic Interaction 3.3 0.001 
Brent Open Interest 1.37 0.172 
Brent Open Interest Interaction 1.18 0.129 
WTI Open Interest 1.54 0.125 
WTI Open Interest Interaction -0.65 0.517 
 
We find the coefficients for the landlocked and transatlantic commodity spreads to be 
significant at the 99% level, whereas the coefficient for WTI and Brent open interest 
are not significant at the 90% level. This implies that the variables for open interest do 
(11) 
(12) 
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not have a statistically significant impact on the spread, whereas the landlocked and 
transatlantic commodity spreads do. 
7.5.3 Analysis 
We now establish what effects our independent variables of interest have had on the 
WTI-Brent spread. As WTI and Brent prices are denoted per barrel, our results have 
the same interpretation. All our relationships are on level-level form, implying that a 
one-unit increase in our independent variable changes the dependent variable equal to 
the coefficient, formally: 
 ∆𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝛽!∆𝑥                                         (13)
         
Here, 𝛽! is the coefficient on the independent variables of interest, denoted x. We will 
analyze the coefficients and interaction terms together. For example, the coefficient 
on transatlantic and the transatlantic interaction term will be discussed jointly.  
 
The capacity issue at Cushing has been widely reviewed as the main cause of the 
divergence between the prices of WTI and Brent. In addition, our stylized theoretical 
analysis demonstrated how a capacity constraint causes prices to diverge. Our 
empirical model confirms this, with the coefficient for landlock being significant at 
the 99% level. The coefficient is positive with a corresponding value of 0.770, 
inferring that all else equal, an increase in the landlocked commodity spread of $1 
increases the spread by $0.770. This implies that for our whole sample set, the effect 
of the landlocked commodity spread is large and significant. After the break in the 
long-term relationship, the impact of the landlocked commodity spread increases 
further. The coefficient on landlock’s interaction term is 0.197 and significant at the 
99% level, increasing the total effect of the pipeline capacity constraint after the break 
to $0.967, all else equal.  
 
The results confirm what we hypothesized, that pipeline capacity issues at Cushing 
have had a significant impact on the spread, and increased in significance between 
2010 and 2014. 
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A less discussed issue is the influence of the transatlantic commodity spread. With 
capacity issues hindering the supply of crude to nearby refineries, transportation costs 
can be a significant factor on the spread. Our empirical model confirms this, as the 
transatlantic coefficient has a positive sign with a value of 0.599, significant at the 
99% level. This result indicates that a $1 increase in the transatlantic commodity 
spread, all else equal, increases the spread by $0.599. The result implies that 
throughout our sample period a change in transportation costs across the Atlantic 
converts either into reduced Brent prices or increased WTI prices. The interaction 
term for the transatlantic commodity spread is also significant. By adding the 
coefficients, we find that a $1 dollar increase in the transatlantic spread, all else equal, 
translates to an increase of $0.961.  
 
It is apparent from our results that the transportation costs across the Atlantic has had 
a significant impact on the spread. Low transportation costs increases demand for 
Brent as refineries and other consumers find it profitable to import it. It is also 
apparent that the transportation costs has had an increased significance on the spread 
after the ending of the relationship. The coefficient increased by $0.362, signaling that 
changes in the cost of transportation had a larger impact on the spread after the break. 
As transportation costs were lower after the break, illustrated by the Baltic Dry Index 
in section 10.1.6 in the appendix, we can infer that the demand for Brent increased. 
This result sheds light on that not only infrastructure issues at Cushing has had an 
effect on decoupling WTI and Brent prices. Low transportation costs across the 
Atlantic could have lessened the pressure on expanding the infrastructure out of 
Cushing, and thus extended the period of the spread’s unusual behavior.  
 
From the results we can infer that both supply and demand, represented by the 
landlocked and transatlantic commodity spread, has had a significant effect on the 
spread, decoupling WTI from world prices. However, the effect of the landlocked 
commodity spread can be further studied. As mentioned in section 3.1.1.2, surging 
crude prices spurred the transformation of oil technology. Consequently, 
unconventional oil became economically viable. Imported shale oil from Canada and 
the surge of tight oil production in North Dakota increased pressure on Cushing’s 
infrastructure. Therefore, one can advocate that the supply shock came as a 
  
70 
consequence of high crude oil prices, caused by a prolonged period of high demand 
for crude. 
 
We also hypothesized that even though we are dealing with the most traded 
commodities in the world, the amount of futures trading has not had an effect on the 
fundamental relationship between WTI and Brent. We tested this hypothesis by 
including the open interest of Brent and WTI in the regression. Even though the 
futures markets has a significant impact on WTI spot prices and the fact that Brent 
futures are the most traded commodity in the world, our regression results infer that 
neither the open interest for Brent nor WTI have a statistically significant impact on 
the spread throughout our sample period. 
 
With the results from our empirical analysis we conclude that our hypotheses, 
outlined in section 2, could not be rejected. We hypothesized that supply conditions at 
Cushing has had a significant effect on the spread between WTI and Brent, which our 
empirical findings could not reject. In addition, our empirical results showed that 
transportations costs across the Atlantic had a significant impact on the spread, 
extending the divergence between the crudes. We also confirmed that even though the 
two crudes are the most traded commodities on the market, the volume of futures 
trading has not had an impact on the spread’s divergence.  
 
After controlling for many of the factors that can influence the prices of WTI and 
Brent, we can infer that a lack of pipeline infrastructure at Cushing, combined with 
transportation costs, is significant in explaining the divergence of the two crude oil 
prices between 2010 and 2014. 
7.6 Limitations 
In this section we highlight some of the limitations in our data and method. It is 
important to be aware of the limitations in our research; both for the convenience of 
the reader, but also for those who wish to extend our analysis.  
7.6.1 Method 
For our analysis of the long-term relationship we utilized the Engle-Granger two-step 
test for cointegration, combined with a recursive analysis. Although the Engle-
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Granger test is adept at examining whether two variables are cointegrated, other tests 
such as a Chow test for structural breaks might be more fitting to pinpoint break 
dates. The Chow test searches for known break dates in a singular time series, 
whereas the Engle-Granger tests for cointegration between two or more time series. 
However, as the Chow test only searches for known break dates and our main focus 
was to examine whether the two crudes were in a long-term relationship, we decided 
that the Engle-Granger two-step test for cointegration was a more relevant statistical 
tool. 
As pointed out by Oglend, Lindbäck & Osmundsen (2013), the test statistic in time 
series analysis can be sensitive to the number of lags used. The Newey-West standard 
errors are also sensitive to this, and thus results might be biased depending on the 
number of lags chosen. To find the optimal number of lags in the ADF test we 
employed the Akaike Information Criteria. Although it is the most suited selection 
method according to Stock and Watson (2012), Verbeek (2008) points out that there 
is no formal consensus on which method to utilize. As various methods can give 
different lag lengths, the choice of selection method might have implications for the 
results. 
George Box (1979) wrote, “Essentially all models are wrong, but some are useful”. 
What he wanted to point out was that no model is in essence correct, but 
simplifications of the real world. Despite their weaknesses, econometric models can 
be useful in guiding the user to understand the mechanisms that affect the dependent 
variable. Even though our model does not capture all effects, it will give the reader an 
insight into what has affected the spread.  
7.6.2 Data 
There are a significant number of factors that affect crude oil prices. To study all 
these factors and their implications on the WTI-Brent spread would require a far more 
extensive dataset, surpassing the range of our work. Furthermore, our empirical 
results are based on weekly, public data. If we had access to non-disclosed data our 
analysis and research would have been more robust.  
In our data sample, variables for Saudi Arabian production of crude and total OPEC 
spare capacity are included. However, we have only managed to account for monthly 
  
72 
production and spare capacity data, having to interpolate the data in order to use them 
in our regression. This implies that we might incur measurement errors, although 
none of the variables are volatile.  
 
Unlike earlier research, we are not able to exclude Saudi Arabian spare capacity from 
total OPEC spare capacity. The OPEC spare capacity is only publicly available in 
aggregated form and we can therefore not isolate Saudi Arabian spare capacity from 
that of OPEC. Büyüksahin et al. (2012) argue that the clearest indication of a 
significant change in the world energy fundamentals is reflected in the OPEC spare 
capacity, excluding Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, they argue that Saudi Arabian spare 
capacity is theoretical at best, and that the crude oil is not of the same quality as Brent 
and WTI. This means that a refinery cannot easily switch between the crudes in the 
short run. However, in spite of these factors, we believe the OPEC spare capacity is a 
variable that should be included and controlled for as it has implications on the price 
of Brent. 
 
Another potential limitation in our data is the proxy for real economic activity. We are 
dependent on the Baltic Dry Index to pick up the wanted effects from global demand, 
but there is a certain fear that the index reflects information that is distinctive to the 
shipping market. Especially supply side factors in the shipping market can weaken the 
direct link between freight rates and real economic activity. However, several papers 
use the index to account for economic activity (see e.g. Sørensen, 2009; Bakshi, 
Panayotov & Skoulakis, 2011; Fan and Xu, 2011), and contrary to some conventional 
measures of activity, freight rates will account for effects from large economies, such 
as China and India, where data is difficult to obtain.  
 
We are not able to control for BFOE crude production, as the data available only 
dates back to mid-2007. Before this, the aggregated production numbers for the 
benchmark are uncertain, as the BFOE benchmark did not exist in its present form. 
Because the production volume from Ekofisk is not available before 2007, the 
production numbers for the Brent benchmark will be artificially low. Due to this 
uncertainty we decided not to include this variable and is thus a limitation. In 
addition, the variable ADS, a variable for U.S. economic activity, is only available on 
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a daily basis. To account for this we averaged every week, which may give some 
measurement errors. 
 
Our variables on the Arab Spring and hurricane activity are dummy variables and 
equal to one when active. Although dummy variables are easy to interpret, we might 
lose some of the variation in our sample data. 
7.7 Implications 
This section explores some of the more important implications of our findings from 
the unusual behavior in the WTI-Brent spread.  
 
The fact that infrastructure problems at Cushing led WTI to disconnect from Brent 
and other light sweet crudes, have implications for the non-arbitrage theory presented 
by Fattouh (2009), and the relationship between WTI and Brent presented in his 
research. Although we did not empirically test his theory, our findings suggest that the 
model should be extended to account for infrastructure issues at Cushing, in addition 
to the cost of carry for Brent and the quality discount, to fulfill the non-arbitrage 
condition. This has implications for arbitrageurs in the commodity market as well. In 
addition to the usual arbitrage conditions, they need to anticipate changes in the 
pipeline infrastructure at Cushing to profit from fundamental arbitrage trading 
between WTI and Brent. 
 
The same infrastructure problems at Cushing led WTI to disconnect from other light 
sweet crudes and distillate product prices, creating historically high margins for 
refineries utilizing it. The implication of WTI’s divergence from other crudes can be 
seen in the refineries’ crack spread, an approximation of its yield. Figure 13 depicts 
the 3:2:1 crack spread for WTI, Brent and LLS. The 3:2:1 crack spread reflects a 
refinery’s revenue and cost, and therefore its profit. The intuition is that 3 barrels of 
crude will yield roughly 2 units of gasoil and 1 unit of diesel fuel.  
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Figure 13 – 3:2:1 Crack Spreads for WTI, Brent and LLS  (Bloomberg L.P., 2014b) 
 
The crack spreads move in tandem in the period between 2000 and 2010, before the 
cointegrated relationship between WTI and Brent ended. As a direct consequence of 
the decreased WTI prices, the corresponding WTI crack spread decouples from Brent 
and LLS in 2010, with refineries utilizing WTI experiencing a prolonged period of 
abnormal margins. 
 
The decoupling has also had implications for the end users of distillate products. U.S. 
airlines have historically used crude oil contracts on WTI to hedge against a price 
increase in jet fuels. The price divergence between WTI and jet fuel prices caused 
several airlines to lose millions in fuel hedging ineffectiveness, as they no longer were 
insulated from rising fuel costs. As a consequence, some U.S. airlines switched from 
derivatives on WTI to derivatives linked to Brent and LLS for their jet fuel hedging. 
 
Due to its decoupling from light sweet crudes, the WTI benchmark faces losing its 
market position in the global crude market, as it may no longer be the most suitable 
benchmark for hedging global risk, domestic risk or both. Persistent infrastructure 
issues at Cushing, the fact that it only captures U.S. domestic conditions, and that an 
increasing amount of unconventional oil in North America is priced relative to LLS 
points in this direction. As a result, LLS is quickly becoming a benchmark of 
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significance in the U.S. market and, unless pipeline issues are completely resolved, 
might replace WTI as a leading benchmark in North America.  
8. Conclusion 
In this thesis we have analyzed the relationship between WTI and Brent since 2000. 
For a prolonged period of time Brent traded at a premium to WTI, despite being of 
slightly lower quality. It is this unusual spread between the crudes that was the 
essence of our research. 
 
To confirm whether the relationship between WTI and Brent had ended we utilized an 
Engle-Granger two-step test for cointegration. From the test results, we found that we 
could no longer surmise that the two crudes were in a cointegrated relationship, at the 
90% level of significance, in early 2010.  
 
We also tested whether the crude prices were in a new relationship, and found 
evidence for this at the beginning of 2014, being able to reject our null hypothesis at 
the 95% level of significance. New infrastructure came online and eased pressure at 
Cushing, increasing the flow of WTI to the market. However, in the new relationship, 
Brent trades at a premium to WTI as long as pipeline constraints in Cushing are 
apparent.  
 
After finding that the crudes were no longer in a cointegrated relationship, we 
decomposed the spread to examine what might have caused the spread’s unusual 
behavior. We decomposed the WTI-Brent spread into three components, a landlocked 
commodity spread that captures local supply conditions at Cushing, a transatlantic 
commodity spread that captures transportation costs across the Atlantic and a Brent 
nearby time spread that captures the immediate demand for Brent. Descriptive 
statistics on the components indicated that supply factors in Cushing, combined with 
transportation costs, caused the unusual behavior between 2010 and 2014. In addition, 
we examined the West Texas quality spread, and found it to fluctuate in the same 
period. We accrued this fluctuation to result from tightness in the North American oil 
market, which increased demand for lighter crudes and consequently depressed the 
price of the low quality WTS. 
  
76 
After decomposing the spread, we built an empirical model to test the validity of our 
findings and quantify the individual effects on the WTI-Brent spread. Our results 
supported the findings from the spread decomposition, with supply side factors in 
Cushing and fluctuations in transportation costs across the Atlantic having a 
significant effect on the spread. In addition, we tested whether open interest had an 
effect on the spread. Our empirical model, however, could find little evidence for this. 
  
In accordance with previous research, we found that the divergence of the WTI-Brent 
spread can be accrued to Cushing’s lack of infrastructure. Cushing experienced an 
increasing inflow of crude due to the increased unconventional oil production in 
North America. Production across the continent soared to record highs, incentivizing 
an infrastructure expansion to move this new oil to Cushing, but with little possibility 
of shifting the oil out.  
 
What our research also uncovered was that transportation costs across the Atlantic 
have impacted and extended the price divergence between WTI and Brent. This has, 
to our knowledge, not been identified in earlier research. Transportation costs fell in 
the period after the financial crisis, making Brent a more viable crude to export to 
international markets. Decreasing transportation costs from 2010 could have 
decreased the pressure on pipeline expansion out of Cushing, as Brent was an 
economically viable alternative.  
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10. Appendix 
10.1.1 U.S Production and Import 
Figure 14 illustrates the U.S. production of unconventional oil from the Bakken Field 
in North Dakota and imported crude oil from Canada to Cushing. 
 
Figure 14 - U.S. Production and Import from Canada 
10.1.2 Relationship Between OPEC and Brent 
Figure 15 is a graphical presentation of the inverse relationship between the OPEC 
spare capacity and Brent crude prices. 
 
Figure 15 - Brent Spot and OPEC Spare Capacity 
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10.1.3 The Akaike Information Criterion 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) offers a choice of the number of lags one 
should include in a model. It deals with the goodness of fit of the model, the 
complexity, and the trade-off between the two. The AIC formula is: 
 𝐴𝐼𝐶 𝑝 = 𝑙𝑛 !!" !! + (𝑝 + 1) !!                 (14) 
 
Where SSR(P) is the sum of squared residuals of the estimated AR(p). 
10.1.4 Robustness Test 
10.1.4.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller for Spot Prices 
Table 14 shows the results from the robustness check on spot prices. 
 
Table 14 - Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results 
 
  
10.1.4.2 Recursive Analysis for Spot Prices 
Figure 16 shows the result from the recursive analysis on spot prices in the robustness 
check. 
WTI Brent
Number of lags 6 2
Test statistic -1.686 -1.488
Differentiated
Number of lags 5 1
Test statistic -25.417 -43.668
Critical values
10%
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2000-2014
-2.57
Spot
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Figure 16 - Recursive Analysis for Spot Prices 
 
10.1.5 Descriptive Statistics of the Spread Decomposition 
Tables 15 to 17 are descriptive statistics for the spread decomposition presented in 
section 7.3. 
 
Table 15 - Descriptive Statistics 2000-2010 
Spread Observations Mean Volatility 
Spread 2460 1.19 1.91 
Landlock 2460 -1.01 1.68 
Transatlantic 2460 2.46 1.54 
Brenttime 2460 0.28 1.52 
WTI-Quality 2460 3.34 1.81 
 
Table 16 - Descriptive Statistics 2010-2014 
Spread Observations Mean Volatility 
Spread 987 -11.29 7.92 
Landlock 987 -11.88 7.73 
Transatlantic 987 0.63 3.33 
Brenttime 987 0.05 1.72 
WTI-Quality 987 3.12 3.17 
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Table 17 - Descriptive Statistics 2014 
Spread Observations Mean Volatility 
Spread 197 -6.79 2.26 
Landlocked 197 -3.89 2.02 
Transatlantic 197 -2.48 2.39 
Brenttime 197 0.37 1.19 
WTI-Quality 197 6.92 2.3 
 
10.1.6 The Baltic Dry Index 
The Baltic Dry Index is issued daily by the Baltic Exchange. It is not restricted to the 
Baltic Sea and its surrounding countries, but provides an assessment of the price of 
moving the major raw materials by sea (The Baltic Exchange, 2014). Figure 17 
illustrates the index between 2000 and 2014. 
 
Figure 17 - The Baltic Dry Index 
 
10.1.7 Ordinary Least Squares 
Time-series data comes with temporal ordering, is not a random sample of units, and 
is almost always correlated over time. Due to these factors the assumptions for cross-
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sectional assumptions must be altered. The Gauss-Markov assumptions for time-
series data are: 
1. The population is linear in parameters  
2. There is no existence of perfect collinearity 
3. Zero conditional mean 
4. Homoscedasticity in the error term 
5. No serial correlation 
6. Normality 
 
Assumption 1: The population is linear in parameters  
It is assumed that there is a linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables, with a simple model shown as: 
 𝑦! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥!! + 𝑢!                   (15) 
 
Where t is used to index time. 
-u: error term, represents factors other than x that affect y. 
-𝛽!: the population constant term/intercept 
-𝛽!: population slope parameter 
 
Assumption 2: There is no existence of perfect collinearity 
This implies that each 𝑥!"varies somewhat over time, and no explanatory variable is 
an exact linear function of the others. This rules out perfect correlation.  
 
Assumption 3: Zero conditional mean 
It is assumed that contemporaneous exogeneity holds, that is for every t, 
 𝐸 𝑢! 𝑥!!,… 𝑥!" = 𝐸 𝑢! = 0                     (16) 
 
This allows for lagged dependent and explanatory variables that react to past changes 
in the dependent variable. 
 
Assumption 4: Homoscedasticity 
  
88 
For all t, 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑢! 𝑥𝒕 = 𝜎!                    (17) 
 
This is the contemporaneous form of the homoscedastic assumption. 
 
Assumption 5: No serial correlation 
The contemporaneous assumption is stated as, 
 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑢! ,𝑢! 𝒙𝒕,𝒙𝒔 = 0                   (18) 
 
Assumption 6: Normality [𝑢!] is independent of the explanatory variables, x, and is independent and identically 
distributed as:  
 𝑢!~  𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 0,𝜎! , 𝑡 = 1,2,…𝑛                  (19) 
10.1.8 Newey-West Standard Errors: 
The Newey-West standard error corrects the estimated standard errors from Ordinary 
Least Squares by making them robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. One 
drawback is that Ordinary Least Squares is not efficient; there exists an unbiased 
linear estimator with a lower variance. However, if the fear of autocorrelation is 
apparent, Newey-West is an accepted way of ridding oneself of this problem. 
 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑒𝑦 −𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝑠. 𝑒 = !!!!!( !!!!!!! )𝑔𝑒!𝑒!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!                           (20) 
10.1.9 Testing Coefficients 
10.1.9.1 Testing One Coefficient 
We test the coefficient on the independent variable to understand whether it has a 
significant effect on our dependent variable. 
 
The null hypothesis is that the coefficient does not have a significant effect: 
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𝐻! = 0                      (21) 
 
Our alternative hypothesis is based on whether we believe that our coefficient is 
larger/lesser than nil, or that it varies from nil. 
 
One sided test: 𝐻! > 𝑜𝑟 < 0                  (22) 
Two sided test: 𝐻! ≠ 0 
 
We chose a level of significance 𝛼, usually 5%, which gives us our Type 1 error.  
 
Our test parameter is: 𝑡 = (!!!!!)!"  (!!)  where 𝐵! is our null hypothesis.  
10.1.9.2 Testing Multiple Coefficients 
Here we test whether a group of variables has no effect on the dependent variable. We 
also test for joint significance, i.e. that the variables in combination give a significant 
effect on the dependent variable, even though they separately may not have any 
effect. 
 
We operate with two models, one restricted and one unrestricted. The unrestricted 
model includes all our variables, while the restricted do not include the variables we 
want to test. The model, given that 𝐻! is true, is the restricted model. 
 
The F-test is based on the idea of comparing 𝑆𝑆𝑅!" and 𝑆𝑆𝑅! . If the unrestricted 
model is “sufficiently lower” than the restricted model, we should reject our null 
hypothesis. 
 
The test parameter is: 
 𝐹 = (!!"!!!!"!")/!!!"!"/(!!!!!) ,  or if we only have the 𝑅!: 𝐹 = (!!"! !!!!)/!(!!!!"! )/(!!!!!) 
 
Where q is the number of exclusion restrictions and k is the number of parameters in 
the unrestricted model. 
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10.1.10 Open Interest for WTI and Brent 
Figure 18 is a graphical illustration of the open interest for WTI and Brent.  
 
 
Figure 18 - Open Interest for WTI and Brent 
 
10.1.11 Regression Results 
Table 18 shows the regression results from our empirical model. 
 
Table 18 - Regression Results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Intersect    0.297** 3.454 
  (0.136) (2.407) 
      
Time  -0.00122** -0.00228 
  (0.000621) (0.00156) 
	   	   	  Landlock   0.839***   0.770*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0624) 
   
Landlock Interaction  0.127**   0.197*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0686) 
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Transatlantic    0.742***    0.599*** 
 (0.0668) (0.102) 
   
Transatlantic Interaction    0.242***    0.362*** 
 (0.0725) (0.110) 
   
Brenttime    -0.0605***    -0.0605*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0222) 
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Brent Open Interest 0.00144 0.00214 
  (0.00156) (0.00157) 
      
Brent Open Interest 
Interaction 0.00387 0.00352 
  (0.00429) (0.00232) 
      
WTI Open Interest 0.0019 0.00169 
  (0.00118) (0.00110) 
      
WTI Open Interest 
Interaction -0.00123 -0.000999 
  (0.00162) (0.00154) 
      
Break Dummy -1.078* -1.340* 
  (0.608) (0.785) 
	  	   	  	   	  	  
Saudi Arabia Production - -0.00159 
    (0.00217) 
      
OPEC Spare Capacity - -0.162* 
    (0.0890) 
      
U.S. Rigcount - -0.000134 
    (0.00141) 
      
U.S. Rigcount Intersect - 0.00113 
    (0.00148) 
      
Baltic Dry Exchange  -    0.000131** 
    (0.0000528) 
      
TED-Spread -  0.00339* 
    (0.00177) 
      
NYSE -   -0.000194** 
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    (0.0000844) 
      
ADS -   0.348** 
    (0.150) 
      
USD/EUR - 0.0825 
    (1.065) 
      
Arab Spring Dummy - -0.311 
    (0.684) 
      
Hurricane Dummy - 0.123 
    (0.215) 
      
N 755 755 
Standard errors in parentheses 
	   	  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
	   	   
